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Given the debilitating nature of schizophrenia, as well as recent research supporting the 
efficacy of cognitive therapy to treat schizophrenia and, more specifically, delusional 
ideation, it is important to hone in on aspects of cognitive vulnerability that may be 
related to the development of this disorder. Despite advances in understanding cognitive 
vulnerability processes in schizophrenia, studies investigating these processes in 
individuals at risk for the disorder have been very limited. The purpose of this study was 
to examine specific types of cognitive vulnerability (attributional style and negative self­
schema) in individuals at risk for psychosis in order to identify how overall dysfunctional 
thinking, as well as its particular facets, predict specific types of delusions in individuals 
at risk for psychosis. It was hypothesized that the existence of negative self-schema and 
type of attributional style, in combination with different risk factors, would predict 
delusional ideation.
Results suggested that potentially At-Risk individuals exceeded Control Group 
members on measures of dysfunctional attitudes and delusional ideation, but that there 
were no significant differences in attributional styles between the two groups. It appears 
that the combination of risk factors (specifically genetic risk and general psychological 
symptoms), negative self-schema, and a “blaming others” for negative events 
attributional style best predicts overall delusions, as well as specifically persecutory and 
grandiose ideation. These findings are discussed in terms of gaining important 
knowledge about risk factors for schizophrenia, cognitive predictors of delusions, and 
prevention of full-blown psychosis.
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Introduction
Overview o f Sehizophrenia and its Etiology
Schizophrenia, affecting approximately one percent of the population, has been 
described as one of the most debilitating psychologieal disorders. Hallmark symptoms 
inelude “positive symptoms” sueh as delusions, hallucinations, disorganized speech 
and/or behavior, and “negative symptoms,” including flattened affect, anhedonia, and 
avolition (APA, 2000). As the disorder is diffieult to treat effectively, individuals with 
schizophrenia are often heavily reliant on anti-psychotic medication. In addition, this 
population has a very high suicide rate and frequently suffers from comorbid disorders, 
such as substance abuse/dependence, depression, and anxiety (APA, 2000).
Due to a variety of factors, patients often alternate between acute psychotic 
phases and phases of improvement or recovery (Herz, 1990), and relapse to psychosis has 
been found to be quite characteristie of this disorder. Some research supports the finding 
that there is an equal distribution among patients who recover completely from the 
disorder or have a very long remission (33%), those who generally recover from the 
positive symptoms of the disorder but who are left with residual symptoms in the form of 
flat affeet, social withdrawal, and other negative symptoms (33%), and those who relapse 
back into psychosis (33%); the so-called “1/3 -  1/3 -  1/3” rule (e.g. Doering, et. al.,
1998). Other research has found a similar proportion of individuals with schizophrenia 
who recover completely (25%), but with a small percentage (10%) who suffer a severely 
chronie course and remain permanently hospitalized (e.g., Herz, 1990), also known as
1
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“high redundancy” schizophrenia (Cromwell, 1972). The remainder of patients (between 
50 and 75%) alternate between acute psychotic phases and phases of improvement or 
recovery (Herz, 1990), termed “low redundancy” schizophrenia by Cromwell (1972). The 
high and low redundancy classifications, in addition to pertaining to acuteness, 
chronicity, and prognosis, roughly correspond to positive and negative symptom subtypes 
of schizophrenia. Others have found that even with adherence to an antipsyehotic 
medication regimen, 20 -  48% of patients relapse (e.g. Heinrichs, Cohen, & Carpenter, 
1985).
As a result of the often aeute and incapacitating nature of schizophrenia, a great 
deal of research has been conducted on predictors of onset and relapse in this population. 
Studies have shown that certain demographic characteristics, such as gender (being 
male), age (under 40), and marital status (being single), play a significant role in relapse 
(Doering, et. al., 1998) as does alcohol and drug use (Cuffel & Chase, 1994).
Despite the psychosocial factors that play a significant role in onset and relapse, 
much attention has been given to the biological etiology of schizophrenia, as it appears to 
have a large genetic component (Gottesman, 1991; Kendler & Diehl, 1993); however, it 
is widely acknowledged that there are likely several genes dynamically involved to 
produce the disorder (Green, 2001; Levinson, et al., 1998). Twin and adoption studies 
have found an overall concordance rate for schizophrenia in the range of 27-77% in 
monozygotic twins (MZ) and approximately 9% in dizygotic twins (DZ; Gottesman & 
Shields, 1972). It is notable that these types of studies have been sometimes criticized for 
methodological complications that preclude a clear determination of degree of genetic
2
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versus environmental influence. For instance, many researchers who have studied 
monozygotic twins reared apart posit that these individuals do not share any 
environmental commonalities whatsoever. However, other researchers suggest that 
Pregnancy Birth Complications (PBCs), regarded as environmental (yet biological) risk 
factors for the development of schizophrenia play an important role prenatally and should 
not be ignored (Davis & Phelps, 1995).
While the examination of special environmental factors such as PBCs may 
complicate conclusions drawn from traditional genetics studies, many still consider the 
MZ-DZ twin model when assessing genetic influence and degree of risk for the 
development of this disorder. It has been suggested that as degree of genetic closeness 
grows to a relative with schizophrenia, so does the proband’s risk for schizophrenia. That 
is, first-degree relatives (siblings, parents, and offspring) of individuals of sehizophrenia 
have a much higher chance to develop the disorder themselves (9%, 6%, and 13%, 
respectively) than do second or third degree relatives (Gottesman, 1991). Thus, 
continued research on PBCs and genetic aspects of twins concordant and discordant for 
schizophrenia, as well as other relatives, can provide valuable information to understand 
this complex disorder.
While the biological heritability of sehizophrenia cannot be denied, the disorder is 
most often conceptualized from a diathesis-stress perspective, which highlights the 
interaction o f a genetic or other biologieal disposition for a disorder that creates a 
vulnerability, and events from the environment, which may “trigger” the predisposition 
and lead to the onset of the disorder (Mirsky & Duncan, 1986; Monroe & Simons, 1991;
3
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Nuechterlein,1987). For an individual with schizophrenia, stressors from the 
environment include not only negative life events, but events that are considered pleasant 
as well, such as a social gathering, or some type of achievement or accomplishment 
(Herz, 1990). Zubin and Spring’s (1977) stress-vulnerability model states that an 
individual can repel this stress if the stressful event falls below his/her tolerance 
threshold, which is defined by the level of genetic vulnerability to schizophrenia that the 
individual possesses; however, if the stressful situation is above the tolerance threshold, 
then a psychotic episode may develop. Nicholson and Neufeld (1992) have extended this 
model and developed a “dynamic vulnerability perspective” which hypothesizes that an 
individual’s ability to cope with stress is influenced by genetic vulnerability, levels of 
stressors, as well as by bis/her symptoms. They suggest that not only can stressors create 
an increase in symptoms, but that the existence of symptoms can also increase stress in an 
individual.
In addition to general environmental events and stressors, certain family factors 
have been found to be predictive of onset of schizophrenia as well as relapse to a 
schizophrenic episode (Herz, 1990; Nicholson, 1998; Wynne & Singer, 1963a, 1963b). It 
has been suggested that parental Communication Deviance (e.g. lack of commitment to 
ideas and percepts, language anomalies, disruptive speech, unclear or idiosyncratic 
communication of themes or ideas, and closure problems) may directly affect the 
offspring’s cognitive development and reality testing and potentially lead to subsequent 
thought disorder (Lukoff, Snyder, Ventura, & Neuchterlein, 1984).
One of the most significant interpersonal predictors of relapse to a psychotic
4
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episode is a relative’s level of “Expressed Emotion,” generally defined in terms of an 
influential family member’s behavior and feeling expressions toward the patient with 
schizophrenia. Family members who are considered to exhibit “high EE” tend to be 
critical, hostile, and emotionally overinvolved toward the patients and tend not to offer 
positive remarks or warmth (Brown, Birley, & Wing, 1972; Hooley, 1985; Vaughn & 
Leff, 1976). Studies have shown that patients who have frequent contact with high EE 
family members are two times more likely to relapse within a year than those who have 
more limited contact with high EE family members, or retum to a low EE environment 
post-hospitalization (e.g. Brown, Birley, & Wing, 1972; Leff & Vaughn, 1981;Vaughn & 
Leff, 1976). Relatedly, the construct of “Affective Style” (AS), described as the manner 
in which parents and patients with schizophrenia (as well as with other disorders) interact 
during an emotionally charged discussion, has also been found to be a significant 
predictor of relapse (Doane, Falloon, Goldstein, & Mintz, 1985; Doane, Goldstein, 
Miklowitz, & Falloon, 1986). The AS system categorizes verbal behavior during the 
parent-child exchange into classes such as guilt induction, intrusiveness, and benign and 
personal criticism and support. Research suggesting that EE and AS behaviors only 
partially overlap reinforces the notion that family interaction patterns and their role in the 
etiology and exacerbation of schizophrenia (and other disorders) is very complex (Doane 
& Becker, 1993).
Research focusing on both the biological and interpersonal correlates o f risk to 
psychosis has proven thiittul in increasing knowledge about this disorder. Recently, 
researchers have given more attention to cognitive factors, such as metacognitive
5
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processes and levels of sociotropy and autonomy (Morrison, et al., 2002), that put 
someone at risk for the development of schizophrenia and relapse to psychosis. These 
factors, described later, are the focus of the present study. Given the debilitating effects 
of schizophrenia, investigation into new areas of risk prediction is important.
Rationale and Strategies for Assessing Risk for Schizophrenia
The literature suggests that psychotic symptoms, in particular delusions, can be 
conceptualized as severe expressions of beliefs and traits that exist at lower intensities in 
“normal,” or “sub-clinical” populations (Claridge, 1972, 1987; Edell, 1995). Lower-level 
delusional ideation may therefore manifest itself in individuals who do not have a 
diagnosable psychiatric condition, but who may show signs of psychopathology or 
psychotic thought processes (Peters, Joseph, & Garety, 1999). Given the existence of this 
low-level symptomatology and the research that suggests that sueh ideation may develop 
into more severe psychosis in the future (Chapman, Chapman, Kwapil, Eckblad, &
Zinser, 1994; Peters et al., 1999) it is important to examine the beliefs and perceptual 
experiences of such people, in order to gain a greater understanding of the thought 
processes of more disturbed individuals, as well as the longitudinal processes that can 
lead to breakdown. This allows gains in knowledge about the development of psychosis, 
as well as the environmental risk and protective factors related to such disturbances 
(Chapman & Chapman, 1985). As research suggests that a longer Duration of Untreated 
Psychosis (DUP) results in a poorer prognosis (Loebel, Lieberman, Alvir, Mayerhoff, 
Geisler, & Szymanski, 1992), an examination of individuals with subclinical 
psychopathological symptoms that can aid in prediction may therefore help with
6
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prevention of full-blown psychosis, or with decreasing its duration and hence lessening 
the debilitating financial, emotional, and interpersonal consequences of the disorder.
There have been several approaches to the assessment of risk for schizophrenia. 
Initially, researchers focused on the genetic component and conducted longitudinal 
studies examining first-degree relatives (e.g. offspring) of individuals with schizophrenia, 
as well as other family members, in order to monitor their potential development of the 
disorder via continuous follow-up assessments over a period of several years (Asamow, 
1988). While this research technique has some benefits, it is quite time-consuming and 
expensive. More importantly, in these targeted individuals, the transition rate to 
psychosis is generally not large (Asamow, 1988), as the genetic risk for first-degree 
relatives of individuals with schizophrenia only ranges from approximately 6 to 13% 
(Gottesman, 1991), leaving a false positive rate of approximately 85% and thus 
precluding the attainment of high-yield data about risk.
Another strategy frequently utilized to gain information about correlates of risk is 
associated with the study of the “prodrome,” or the changes in behavior that occur just 
before the transition to a full psychotic break (E. Bleuler, 1911/1950; Heinrichs, et al, 
1985; Herz, 1990). These indicators are often conceptualized as low-level or subthreshold 
symptoms and have led to a line of research which suggests that some individuals, who 
may or may not have a genetic predisposition for psychosis, likely experience these 
symptoms (“schizotypal” symptoms or “schizotypy”) well before the development o f a 
psychotic disorder (Chapman & Chapman, 1985; Strauss, 1969). “Hypothetical 
psychosis-proneness,” earlier termed “schizotaxia” by Meehl (1962, 1990, 1993), is
7
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regarded as a vulnerability characteristic for the long-term development of psychosis, and 
can be measured via endorsement (from a series of paper and pencil measures) of 
deviantly high levels of psychotic-like experiences such as the identification of thought 
transmission, passivity experiences, voice experiences and other auditory hallucinations, 
as well as aberrant beliefs (Chapman & Chapman, 1985)
In the 25-month follow-up study of former college student participants who had 
previously been identified as hypothetically psychosis prone. Chapman and Chapman
1985) found that only three subjects (out of approximately 200 at-risk) had made the 
transition to diagnosable psychosis. At the 10-year follow-up mark. Chapman and 
colleagues (1994) found that participants significantly exceeded control subjects on 
diagnoses of DSM-III-R psychoses, as well as on psychotic-like experiences, schizotypal 
symptoms, and reports of having psychotic relatives. While the construct (and 
measurement) of psychosis proneness does have some long-term predictive validity, the 
Chapman group found that, in fact, only a small percentage of putatively at-risk 
individuals break down after 10 years (approximately 14 out of 182 participants), 
estimated elsewhere (Meehl, 1990; 1993) as approximately 10% of “schizotypes” 
proceeding to develop clinical schizophrenia. Due to this limited predictive power, the 
Chapman group developed and validated additional measures to add to their high-risk 
assessment battery, including more “trait-like” measures of schizotypy.
This line o f research reinforces the idea that not everyone who presents with 
certain types of vulnerability (e.g. genetic predisposition or characteristics of prodromal 
schizophrenia) will go on to develop a psychotic disorder. It is suggested that they may
8
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not develop any diagnosable psychological problem at all, or may develop another 
disorder instead, such as bipolar disorder or major depression. In addition, it has been 
suggested that the construct of the “prodrome” can only truly be evaluated and 
understood retrospectively (Yung, McGorry, & McFarlane, 1996). Thus, researchers 
have adopted the term “at-risk mental state” to describe individuals who are at risk for 
psychosis, but who may not definitely develop a full-blown disorder (Yung, et. al., 1996; 
Yung et al., 1998).
Using strategies based on those of Chapman and colleagues and others to assess 
state-like psychotic characteristics, other researchers (e.g., Yung et al., 1998; Morrison, et 
al., 2002) have identified individuals who are at risk for schizophrenia by examining 
specific transient and attenuated psychotic symptoms. Transient psychotic symptoms, 
also known as Brief Limited Intermittent Psychotic Symptoms (BLIPS), are defined by 
these researchers as including at least one of the following, operationalized by cut-off 
scores on the Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (BPRS) within the hallucinations, delusions, 
and/or Formal Thought Disorder subscales of the measure. All symptoms must also last 
for less than one week and resolve spontaneously. The concept of attenuated symptoms 
relies on the notion of subclinical psychopathology mentioned above and these indicators 
are defined by the presence of at least one of the following symptoms of DSM-IV 
schizot}^al personality disorder: Ideas of reference, perceptual disturbance, odd beliefs or 
magical thinking, odd behavior or appearance, or paranoid ideation. These symptoms 
require slightly lower cut-off scores on the BPRS, have existed for longer than one week,
9
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and occur several times each week. When combined with additional state and trait 
factors (such as decreased functioning and genetic predisposition for schizophrenia, 
respectively), this attention to the transient and attenuated psychotic symptoms may 
increase the chances of targeting individuals who are at risk to develop a psychotic 
disorder.
More specifically, this “trait plus state” strategy employs combining “trait” 
factors, such as a family history of schizophrenia in a first degree relative or a diagnosis 
of schizotypal personality disorder in the index subject, with a variety of mental state 
characteristics indicative of risk, including elevated levels of general psychopathology, 
specific psychotic-like symptoms, or a decline to some degree in overall social or 
occupational functioning. In a study targeting an at-risk group and examining their rate 
of transition to psychosis through monthly follow-up assessments, Yung and colleagues 
(1998) developed and utilized both a state-only and the state-trait risk criteria and 
collected a very heterogeneous sample of individuals, some of whom were at imminent 
risk for the development of a psychotic disorder. Participants who had: a) a first degree 
relative with a history of any psychotic disorder or b) a diagnosis of schizotypal 
personality disorder and c) “any change in mental state or functioning which results in a 
loss of 30 points or more on the Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) scale for at 
least one month” (p. 16) and were d) between the ages of 16 and 30 (high risk age range) 
were included in the Yung et al. study.
Morrison and colleagues (2002), in an investigation of the efficacy of cognitive 
therapy as prevention of the transition to psychosis in high-risk subjects, utilized similar
10
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criteria for inclusion in the study. In his study, participants who 1) possessed transient 
psychotic symptoms (BLIPS) or attenuated symptoms (measured using Yung and 
colleagues’ criteria) and 2) had a family history of a first-degree relative with any 
psychotic disorder or a diagnosis themselves of Schizotypal Personality disorder and 3) 
had an at-risk mental state as defined by a drop in GAF of 30 points or more and/or an 
elevated score on a measure of general psychopathology (the General Health 
Questionnaire, GHQ, Goldberg & Hillier, 1979) and 4) were between the ages of 16 and 
36 were admitted to the study and randomly assigned to one of two intervention 
conditions.
Yung and colleagues found that approximately 40% of their participants made the 
transition to psychosis after six months, hi the Morrison and colleagues study, 
approximately 22% of participants became psychotic within six months. These findings 
suggest that utilizing a structured, comprehensive strategy for targeting at-risk individuals 
is beneficial and reduces the false positive rate that has previously occurred in these types 
of studies that rely on fewer indicators. Indeed, there is a good deal of predictive power 
in the “trait plus state” approach to identifying at-risk individuals; this is promising as 
researchers and clinicians work to determine other vulnerability factors (such as 
dysfunctional cognitions) and to develop effective methods of prevention.
Overview  o f  the Cognitive M odel o f  Psychopathology
While only recently being applied systematically to the study of schizophrenia, 
cognitive models have been widely accepted as valid conceptualizations of several
11
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psychological disorders, particularly the anxiety disorders and depression (Beck, 1976; 
Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979; J. Beck, 1995). In general, cognitive theories of 
psychopathology highlight the existence and consequences of maladaptive cognitive 
styles. These styles may be further defined as manners of interpreting and understanding 
events or interactions that lead to a distortion or misinterpretation of reality (Freeman & 
Reinecke, 1995). Such thinking patterns in turn may precipitate or exacerbate 
psychological symptoms (Beck, 1976; Beck, et a l, 1979). Dysfunctional thinking styles, 
as they relate to the development of depression in particular, have been conceptualized as 
latent diatheses (separate from the genetic and biological diatheses previously discussed), 
which in the presence of environmental stressors make an individual more vulnerable to 
developing the disorder (Abramson, Alloy, & Metalsky, 1988; Ingram, Miranda, &
Segal, 1998). The specific mechanisms through which this cognitive dysfunction 
develops and sustains itself are varied and have been widely researched and examined in 
psychotherapeutic interventions over the years. As much of cognitive theory was initially 
developed to conceptualize clinical depression, the discussion of these mechanisms will 
focus on that disorder.
The Cognitive Triad and Schemata
The Cognitive Triad, first proposed by Aaron Beck several decades ago (Beck, 
1976), is used in the model as a way to describe more specifically the negative thoughts 
or maladaptive cognitions that a person with depression likely possesses. It has been 
suggested that individuals with depression hold these dysfunctional thoughts in relation
12
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to one (or all) of the three important areas of the triad -  the self, the world, and the future, 
and that the problems of virtually all patients can be linked to maladaptive beliefs in one 
of the three portions of this “Triad,” (Freeman, & Reinecke, 1995).
Schemata, originally conceptualized in the fields of cognition and cognitive- 
developmental psychology, are generally defined as abstract mental structures that aid in 
organizing information in one’s environment. According to Beck and colleagues, 
schemata may be described as “cognitive structures of the mind,” (J. Beck, 1995, p. 166): 
Stable, underlying beliefs and assumptions concerning the elements in the Triad. 
Schemata provide meaning and understanding for one’s past and current experiences as 
cognitive (as well as emotional) representations of events. These representations of the 
self, the world, and the future are maintained and solidified through the process of 
“assimilation” (Piaget, 1928). It has been suggested that individuals are more prone to 
assimilate their experiences to their existing schemata, rather than “accommodate” the 
belief to fit new events which are discrepant with the schema (Kovacs & Beck, 1978). 
Developing in infancy as the child interacts with others and with his/her environment, 
these beliefs are consolidated throughout childhood, and they often represent 
“internalizations of ongoing or repetitious parental behavior” (Freeman, & Reinecke, 
1995, p. 190). Later in life, the set of beliefs becomes repeatedly activated by events that 
appear similar to those formative early experiences.
Generally speaking, people maintain basically positive schemas about themselves, 
the world, and their capabilities (e.g., “I am worthwhile,” “I can function on a daily 
basis,” “People are generally good,” “The world is basically a safe place,” etc.).
13
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Although these self-schemas may be unrealistically positive (“positive illusions”), it has 
been suggested that overly, even inaccurately, positive beliefs about the self are often 
more adaptive than accurate beliefs (Taylor & Brown, 1988). While it is not theorized to 
be the case that a single traumatic or negative life event produces a maladaptive schema 
(Freeman, & Reinecke, 1995), repeated damaging interactions with others (e.g., family 
members) are stored in memory and may aid in the encoding of beliefs about people (i.e., 
“Others will let you down”) and oneself (i.e., “I am difficult to love”), which become 
templates for how a person evaluates events in his/her adult life.
It has been suggested that such negative schemas are present in individuals who 
suffer from psychological disorders, that they underlie many symptoms, and play an 
etiological role. In the case of clinical depression, for example, negative self-referent 
schemas are present and often include themes of personal inadequacy, self-blame, and 
negative assumptions and expectations about oneself. Such maladaptive self-schemas 
may he broadly categorized as beliefs associated with helplessness (“I am powerless; I 
am defective”) and with unlovability (“I am unlikable; I am bound to be alone”) (Beck, 
cited in J. Beck, 1995). It is suggested that some individuals with depression may have 
negative self-schemas that fall into one category or the other, while others may have 
beliefs that are based on both helplessness and unlovability (J. Beck, 1995). Schemas are 
believed to serve as the source for the manifestation of the repetitious maladaptive 
thoughts, interpersonal interactions, and behaviors frequently seen in individuals with 
psychological disorders.
14
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Automatic Thoughts and Cognitive Distortions
Automatic thoughts, streams of uncontrolled thinking that are often in our 
immediate awareness, are produced by stimuli (external events or thoughts about events), 
are fairly transitory, and are typically related to a specific set of emotions or behaviors 
(Beck, Epstein, & Harrison, 1983a). In general, people engage in reality testing 
(evaluating and correcting thoughts or perceptions after examination of information from 
the environment) as they respond to automatic thoughts or cognitions, especially if the 
thoughts are negative. However, distressed individuals may not have the skills to 
conduct such frequent “reality checks” and may therefore have consistently maladaptive 
or distorted cognitions, which greatly influence their affect and actions.
There are a multitude of examples of cognitive distortions to which individuals 
with depression fall prey. While an exhaustive list is beyond the scope of this paper, 
some illustrations of these dysfunctional thinking styles include: “dichotomous thinking” 
(“If I don’t get an A, I am a failure”), “overgeneralization” (“I can never get a break in 
this world”), “should statements” (“I should do whatever my spouse tells me to”), 
“selective abstraction” (“Nothing else matters except the negative details of this 
situation”), and “emotional reasoning” (“Because I feel stupid right now, I must be 
stupid”) (Beck, cited in J. Beck, 1995).
In keeping with the diathesis-stress model of the development of psychological 
disorders, it has been suggested that cognitive distortions are created when a “stressful 
external event... activates an individual’s unrealistic schemata” (Beck, Epstein, & 
Harrison, 1983a, p. 2). In this case, a person’s longstanding negative schema is regarded
15
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as a diathesis or vulnerability factor (unrelated to biological/genetic diatheses), and as it 
interacts with an environmental stressor, a host of distorted cognitions are produced, all 
of which become more negative and difficult to control than they would were it not for 
the onset of the stressful life event. As previously noted, these now-activated schemata 
and negative automatic thoughts may greatly influence the person’s emotional state and 
behaviors, and will create depressive symptoms, for example, in individuals who are at 
risk.
Attributional Stvle and Helplessness
In addition to the cognitive structures (e.g., maladaptive schemata, cognitive 
distortions) that may make an individual prone to develop a psychological disorder like 
depression, attention is often given to one’s cognitive style as a vulnerability marker; the 
former relates to specific perceptions about self while the latter appears to be more 
associated with the general manner in which one perceives causality of events in the 
world. The concept of learned helplessness (Seligman, 1972) suggests that, after a series 
of learning trials without reinforcement, one develops the expectation of negative 
outcomes that are non-contingent upon the response (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 
1978). Relatedly, theory and research have suggested that the specific manner in which 
one interprets events -  regarding the causes, stability, and universality of events — is 
related to the affective and behavioral response to the event (Abramson, Metalsky, & 
Alloy, 1989; Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978). According to this model of 
attributional style, there are three dimensions involved in the emergence of helpless
16
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cognitions -  intemal/extemal (“caused by me” or “caused by another”), stable/unstable 
(“permanent damage” or “temporary damage”), and global/specific (“always” or “just in 
this situation”).
As is the case with schemata, the development of a particular attributional style 
may theoretically be traced back to childhood and is likely related to three important 
interpersonal realms in which a child is traditionally involved: Family and parent-child 
relationships, peer interactions, and teacher-child relationships (Haines, Metalsky, 
Cardamone, & Joiner, 1999). It is suggested that negative interactions in any or all of 
these realms act as a risk factor for a child to develop a depressive attributional style in 
the future.
Many studies have examined specific aspects of helplessness and attributional 
style as related to depression. Helplessness has been found to be a cognitive style highly 
connected to vulnerability to the disorder (Ingram, Miranda, & Segal, 1998). In addition, 
studies have demonstrated that depressed individuals tend to make more internal, stable, 
and global assessments about negative events in life, and more external, unstable, and 
specific attributions about positive events (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978).
Thus, cognitive theory provides a model of the development of psychological 
disorders, particularly depression, complementary to the diathesis-stress paradigm, which 
suggests that one has a latent cognitive vulnerability (apart fi"om any biological 
vulnerability) in the form of negative schemas and a maladaptive cognitive style. When 
an environmental stressor occurs, these specific cognitive responses are triggered, thus 
activating a host of negative automatic thoughts or cognitive distortions and a
17
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depressogenic attributional style. It is important to note, however, that although this 
cognitive style is conceptualized as a generally stable vulnerability factor, it is not 
necessarily irreversible and permanent (Ingram, Miranda, & Segal, 1998).
More recently, proponents of the cognitive model have turned to schizophrenia as 
a disorder to conceptualize within the realm of overall disturbed thinking (Kingdon & 
Turkington, 1994). Historically, Bleuler (1911) focused much of his theoretical work on 
the pattern of loosened associations of thought that he observed in patients with 
schizophrenia. Similarly, the view of schizophrenia as a disorder of thinking was held by 
Kraepelin (1919/1971), who coined the term “dementia praecox” (the original name for 
schizophrenia), suggesting that individuals with this set of disturbed thinking symptoms 
were entering an early phase of dementia.
The cognitive model views schizophrenia’s disordered thinking as consisting of 
several components: Disturbed content of thinking (delusions), disturbed mechanism of 
thinking (loosening of associations, overinclusion, concrete thinking, illogicality and 
irrational reasoning), disturbed expression of thoughts (the linguistic component of 
formal thought disorder, language disturbance), and disturbed manner in which “events in 
the real world are thought about or judged” (Kingdon & Turkington, 1994, p. 43), also 
described as a “lack of common sense” (Cutting & Murphy, 1988).
Once regarded as the disorder that is not able to be effectively treated with 
cognitive therapy, as this set o f interventions was originally targeted for the “neuroses” 
(Beck, in Kingdon & Turkington, 1994), schizophrenia has now been conceptualized in 
terms of negative schemata, dysfunctional attributional styles, and cognitive distortions.
18
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Indeed, cognitive and cognitive behavioral therapies have been empirically tested and 
supported as viable interventions for schizophrenia in general (Kingdon & Turkington, 
1994; Kuipers et al, 1997; Rector, Seeman, & Segal, 2003; Sensky et al, 2000; Tarrier, 
Beckett, Harwood, Baker, Yusupoff, & Ugaarteburu, 1993), and as promising 
interventions to target specific positive symptoms such as delusions (Chadwick & Lowe, 
1994).
The Importance o f Studying Delusions
Regardless of past doubts of the applicability of cognitive interventions to 
symptoms of schizophrenia, delusions actually lend themselves well to cognitive theory 
and techniques (discussed below) and are, in addition, very important to study. 
Historically, the study of delusions was given a great deal of attention, as theorists such 
as Kraepelin (1919/1971), Bleuler, Jaspers (1963), and Schneider spent a great deal of 
time organizing and classifying categories of this symptom. Bleuler (1911/1950) 
proposed that delusions were a product of disturbances of affectivity and associations, 
and could be divided into the categories of “basic delusions” (the main set of beliefs) and 
“elaborative delusions” (basic beliefs extend to other areas of thinking). Schneider 
(1959) suggested that a delusion was not a primary disturbance of perception or 
sensation, but one of symbolic meaning or attribution.
Since the work of these early theorists, however, delusions have not received a 
great deal of attention in the psychopathology literature, despite their prevalence (Winters 
& Neale, 1983) and their importance in the definition, diagnosis, and course of several
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psychiatric conditions (Harrow, MacDonald, Sands, & Silverstein, 1995; Jorgensen,
1994). Not limited to schizophrenia, delusions occur in a variety of disorders, including 
unipolar and bipolar affective disorders, delusional disorder, substance use disorders, 
personality disorders (schizotypal personality disorder and transiently in borderline 
personality disorder), and organic psychoses (Winters & Neale, 1983). Perhaps because 
they occur in so many manifestations of psychopathology, they are not given primary 
diagnostic importance, as many researchers choose to give attention to more general 
syndromes or “basic processes” instead (Jorgensen, 1994; Oltmanns & Maher, 1988, p. 
xi). It is quite valuable, however, to study specific symptoms of disorders as well, in that 
frequently, a patient’s symptoms can often be more reliably identified and more 
meaningfully related to an individual’s past experiences and social background than can a 
syndromal diagnosis or more microscopic psychological processes. In addition, when 
symptoms are not studied individually, “fascinating and important psychological 
phenomena are ignored” (Persons, 1986, p. 1253). Other advantages of studying specific 
symptoms include the avoidance of misclassification of research subjects, the ability to 
formulate and test hypotheses about relationships between symptoms, as well as 
relationships between symptoms and causes and their underlying mechanisms (Persons,
1986).
Furthermore, delusions are extremely common in psychotic patients; they are one of 
the hallmark symptoms of schizophrenia, occurring with much more frequency than 
formal thought disorder (Winters & Neale, 1983). While theorists such as M. Bleuler 
(1978a, 1978b) have suggested that delusional ideation in schizophrenia generally
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subsides after five years, more recent studies have found that even with antipsychotic 
medication, delusions persisted over an eight-year period in 75% of psychotic subjects 
(Jorgensen, 1994), and that, although delusions existed in both patients with bipolar 
affective disorder and schizophrenia, they were more severe, more frequently occurring, 
and persisted for a longer period of time in subjects with schizophrenia (Harrow, et al.,
1995). Delusions also appear to play a significant role in the onset and relapse process 
(Herz, 1990; Jorgensen & Jensen, 1994) and may also influence the process of a first 
psychotic break. They clearly represent a disturbing and socially disruptive symptom 
that often becomes quickly apparent to others in a patient’s environment (Chapman & 
Chapman, 1988; Harrow, Rattenbury, & Stoll, 1988; Yung, et. al., 1998).
While some theorists have eschewed the existence of connections between a 
patient’s specific areas of distress and their delusional content (e.g., Berrios, 1991), there 
are many researchers who have suggested that delusions often have a content which can 
frequently be understood and described in terms of the patient’s social, interpersonal, and 
psychological history, as well as his or her current situation (e.g., Lucas, Sainsbury, & 
Collins, 1962): “In delusions everything which one wishes and fears may find its level of 
expression,” (E. Bleuler, 1911/1950, p. 117). Research suggests that concerns, ideas, and 
aberrant beliefs premorbidly held by individuals who had a subsequent psychotic break 
tend to manifest themselves in the patient’s ensuing delusional content (Chapman & 
Chapman, 1988; Harrow & Prosen, 1978; Harrow, Rattenbury, & Stoll, 1988). Given the 
prevalence, meaning, and persistence of this sjmiptom, as well as the conceptualization of 
schizophrenia as a disorder of thinking, it is useful to understand delusional ideation from
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the perspective of the cognitive model.
The Cognitive Theory o f Delusions
Conventional definitions of delusions highlight the following: They are abnormal 
beliefs or ideas that are 1) certainly false, 2) held with absolute conviction, not 
changeable by facts or arguments, 3) not sanctioned by one’s culture or religious 
subgroup, 4) often fantastic, and 5) of great personal significance to the individual (Butler 
& Braff, 1991; Oltmanns, 1988; Winters & Neale, 1983; APA, 2000). In contrast, the 
use of cognitive conceptualizations of this symptom involves an explanation with a focus 
more on the thought processes that are involved rather than simply the specific content 
(Beck, & Rector, 2002). This is similar to the traditional distinction between “form” and 
“content” of thought.
According to Alford and Beck (1994, p. 370), delusions “involve severe cognitive 
dysfunction that leads to negative (harmful) consequences; simply put, delusions are 
maladaptive cognitive constructions of internal or external phenomena.” Contrary to 
classic psychoanalytic approaches toward delusions, which suggest that delusions can be 
understood mainly through examination of unconscious drives and conflicts that obtain 
symbolic expression, the cognitive model posits that patients experience delusional 
beliefs and the thoughts that lead up to them consciously, within the realm of personal 
awareness. Also diverging from traditional behaviorist approaches, which focus on the 
objective realm of verbal behavior in delusions, the cognitive approach offers that 
delusions are ‘‘’less than the psychoanalysts theorize them to he (they can be directly
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understood apart from psychoanalytic theory) and more than the ‘verbal behavior’ 
conceptualization of some behaviorists” (Alford & Beck, 1994, p. 371). In line with 
cognitive theory’s conceptualization of other psychological disorders, that thoughts 
originate from and influence emotions in a cyclical manner, this theory suggests that the 
content of delusions may also be associated with patients’ affective experiences 
(Freeman, Garety, & Kuipers, 2001).
A traditional and widely-accepted approach to understanding the development 
and maintenance of delusional ideation, the “anomalous perception model” proposed by 
Maher (1988), posits that delusions develop through an individual’s “normal” attempt to 
make sense of an abnormal sensory experience, such as an hallucination. Maher suggests 
that the individual does not have impaired reality testing or judgment, but that he/she is 
naturally disturbed by this perceptual symptom, and “reasonably” searches for a way to 
find meaning in his/her experience, hence arriving at a delusion that is almost demanded 
by the abnormal perception. Notably, this theory has been further tested as a cusp 
catastrophe where the person makes a sudden, near-discontinuous transition to a 
delusional belief, and findings suggest that individuals with reported paranormal (related 
to delusions) experiences exhibit two basic states in reaction to these anomalous 
perceptions. For individuals with a low tolerance for ambiguity, fear tended to exceed 
one’s belief in the event. In the other state, belief in the anomalous event exceeded degree 
of fear in those who had a higher tolerance for ambiguity (Lange & Houran, 2000).
As empirical evidence for the anomalous perception theory, Maher notes that 
people with schizophrenia may have an overly broad attention span, which makes it
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challenging for them to focus on one set of stimuli, and also that illogical reasoning is not 
generally found in delusional individuals (Winters & Neale, 1983). While Maher’s theory 
has received some support, other research has found that abnormal perceptions play a role 
only in some delusions (Bentall, 2001). In addition, studies of hypothetically psychosis- 
prone individuals revealed that many subjects experienced aberrant beliefs (i.e., low-level 
delusions) without reporting the existence of any perceptual anomalies, and vice versa 
(Chapman & Chapman, 1988). Thus, the connection between delusion development and 
abnormal perceptual experiences is by no means obvious or absolute.
Cognitive Biases in Individuals with Delusions
As an alternative explanation of delusions, Bentall (2001; see also Beck & Rector, 
2002) suggests that the documented distorted inferential processes or cognitive biases in 
people with schizophrenia are at the core of understanding the development of delusions. 
The focus here is on cognitive distortions rather than perceptual anomalies. Several 
studies involving patients’ performance on a variety of judgment and reasoning tasks lend 
support to this theory. Research has shown that individuals with delusions are prone to 
give an abnormal amount of weight to evidence that appears to support their initial 
hypotheses, and they tend to “jump to conclusions,” requiring less information before 
reaching a judgment than non-deluded people (Bentall, 2001; Garety, Hemsley, & 
Wessely, 1991). In addition, they appear to have selective biases in information 
processing. On an emotional Stroop task, patients with persecutory delusions (diagnosed 
with either paranoid schizophrenia or delusional disorder) selectively processed words 
with threat and paranoid-related content (Bentall & Kaney, 1989), and on a similar task,
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recalled more threatening story themes than eontrol subjects (Kaney & Bentall, 1992). 
These findings lend support to the idea that individuals with delusions may have a 
“strong emotional need to reach definite ideas about the world and an inability to tolerate 
uncertainty” (Bentall, 2001, p. 141) and also exhibit a great deal of similarity in their use 
of the same types of cognitive distortions (dichotomous thinking, overgeneralization, 
selective abstraction) employed by individuals with clinical depression.
Relatedly, other evidence for cognitive biases in individuals with delusions is 
demonstrated through attribution theory. In contrast to the internal attributions that 
depressed individuals make for negative events and the external attributions made for 
positive events, studies have shown that individuals with persecutory delusions (some of 
whom had diagnoses of paranoid schizophrenia and some with diagnoses of delusional 
disorder) have the opposite pattern; they tend to exhibit abnormally high levels of 
attributing positive events to themselves and negative events to outside factors (Candido 
& Romney, 1990; Kaney & Bentall, 1989; Lyon, Kaney, & Bentall, 1994). When 
examining specific external attributions -  attributions that involve “circumstances” 
(“external-situational attributions”) and those that involve “people” (“external-personal 
attributions”), these deluded individuals tended to blame negative happenings on other 
people and rarely attributed positive or negative events to circumstances, suggesting that 
they perhaps excessively attribute events and experiences to others, which may in turn 
contribute to the emergence of thoughts of persecution (Bentall, 2001). While the 
intemal/extemal dimension was opposite from the attributions of those with depression, 
both groups tended to exhibit stable and global attributions for negative events. The
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abnormal intemal/extemal attributional style demonstrated by deluded individuals is 
regarded as an “extreme form of what social psychologists have termed the ‘self-serving 
bias’” (Kaney & Bentall, 1992, p. 774).
Other evidence for these types of cognitive biases in schizophrenia comes from 
Beck and Rector (2002), who suggest that such individuals exhibit an egocentric bias, in 
that they “see themselves in a drama during whieh most events are relevant to them... 
threats are everywhere... delusional patients may attach personal meanings to almost the 
most mundane events” (p. 457-458). This is related to the classic phenomenology of 
“paranoia.” They eontinue to explain this egocentricity as a comparison to the elevated 
levels of self-focused attention experienced by individuals with social anxiety disorder, 
suggesting that once the “fear network has been aetivated,” even unimportant happenings 
are regarded as self-referent. The comparison of elements of social anxiety and 
persecutory delusions, although diseussed merely as a theoretical example by Beck and 
Rector, suggests a potential conceptual link between these two symptoms, whieh may 
further elucidate the developmental process of delusions.
Dysfunctional Self-Concept
Although congruent with the overall nature of a delusional belief, which is often 
an unusual explanation for an upsetting experienee, it is perhaps eounterintuitive that 
individuals who feel persecuted by others would formulate a grandiose, “self-serving” 
attributional style. Potential answers to this conundrum may be found in theories 
describing persecutory delusions as serving a defensive function against low self-esteem
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(Beck & Rector, 2002; Bentall, 2001; Bentall, Kinderman, & Kaney, 1994; Lyon, Kaney, 
& Bentall, 1994), which are actually quite similar to Kohut’s (1972) theories of the 
development and function of narcissism.
It has been suggested that in “normal” individuals, self-esteem is maintained 
through the use of a cognitive style that generally attributes negative events to factors 
outside oneself, thus removing personal responsibility when this is harmful to self­
esteem. Therefore, for people with persecutory delusions (or elements of narcissism, as 
suggested by Kohut) who have a strikingly exaggerated external attribution style, the 
abnormal beliefs may be an extreme method of saving their low self-esteem at the 
expense of deeming other people as malicious or evil.
While past researchers have not been able to discover this pattern using 
traditional, direct measures of self-esteem, others (e.g., Lyon et al., 1994) have found that 
on a more subtle task of attributional style, deluded (again with diagnoses of either 
schizophrenia or delusional disorder) subjects exhibited a cognitive style similar to the 
depressed subjects (internal attributions for negative events; external for positive events), 
while maintaining their more common self-serving bias on an obvious attribution test. In 
the Lyon and colleagues study, in addition to the Attribution Style Questionnaire (ASQ; 
Peterson, Semmel, Von Baeyer, Abramson, & Seligman, 1982), participants were given 
an implicit attribution task, the Pragmatic Inference Task (PIT; Winters & Neale, 1985). 
In this task, subjects listen to a series o f stories describing themselves participating in 
successful and unsuccessful activities. They are then asked to determine which of two 
causes (one external; one internal) was responsible for the positive or negative outcome
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of each story, although the stories are designed so that neither attribution is more 
obviously correct than the other. It is argued that the causes chosen will reflect 
participants’ true self-evaluations.
The similarity between the implicit self-evaluation style in the deluded group and 
the depressive group in the Lyon and colleagues study supports Zigler & Click’s (1988) 
hypothesis that delusions of persecution may reflect a “masked” form of depression. (Of 
course, delusions -  mood-congruent ones -  can be a feature of major “psychotic” 
depression). Further, it has been suggested that developing a delusion may help a person 
reduce the self-ideal discrepancy that he/she experiences, which often develops as a result 
of negative life events or everyday interactions with others (Bentall, ct a l, 1994). 
Diathesis-stress formulations of other disorders, such as depression, theorize that the 
dysfunctional self-concept (a.k.a., negative self-schema) becomes activated during times 
of stress or in response to criticism from others. This emergence of the dysfunctional 
self-concept is hypothesized to take place in the formation of schizophrenia symptoms, 
particularly delusions (Martin & Penn, 2002). As the individual perceives disapproval, 
negative self-schemas may become activated. To reduce the impact of the emergence of 
such negative views of self, persecutory delusions may emerge as a defense against 
threatened self-esteem and reproach from others.
Beck and Rector (2002) construct a comprehensive theoretical framework in 
which to understand the interaction of cognitive biases and dysfunctional self-concepts as 
precipitants to delusion formation. In keeping with the work of Bentall and colleagues, 
they suggest that delusions are compensations for imderlying deficits in self-esteem, as
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well as feelings and beliefs of “loneliness, unworthiness, evil, incompetence, or 
powerlessness” (p. 461). With regard to the formation of grandiose delusions, they 
suggest that the delusion begins as a fantasy or a daydream that helps promote one’s self- 
concept, and that eventually, people become unable to differentiate between the fantasy 
and reality; they begin to adopt the identity of the figure that they previously emulated. 
However, although one would expect that adopting the identity of a powerful and 
respected figure such as the president, celebrity, or religious deity would offer the person 
feelings of power and joy, dialogue with individuals with grandiose delusions suggests 
that the underlying feelings of isolation and pain are still very much evident. Beck and 
Rector suggest a linear pathway to the development of a grandiose delusion; an example 
of this is presented in Table 1, describing a patient who had the delusion that she was the 
poet laureate.
Explanations of proximal precipitants of the formation of a persecutory delusion 
involve a fear of being evaluated, endangered, or hurt in some manner, often at the hands 
of a group from whom the individual anticipates retaliation. In order to exemplify the 
process more clearly. Beck and Rector provide a case example of a patient who reported 
drug dealing to the police and then saw an article about policemen involved in drug rings. 
The pathway to the subsequent persecutory delusion is presented in Table 2. It follows in 
the theory that one may develop combined grandiose and persecutory delusions, as 
individuals who compensate for deficiencies in positive self-concept would be 
disheartened to realize that others in their day to day lives do not treat them with the 
respeet and awe that would be appropriate for someone of their talent or stature. It is
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likely that they in turn will try to find reasons for the lack of respect from others, and may 
come to the conclusion that others are jealous, and therefore plotting to destroy them. An 
example of such a combined delusion would be the belief that one is Jesus and about to 
be crucified.
Thus, it is suggested that delusions may be the result the interplay of an 
“epistemological impulsiveness” (frequent “jumping to conclusions,” perhaps due to a 
strong need for certainty; Bentall, 2001, p. 142), selective biases of information 
processing, an externalizing attribution style for negative events, and an egocentricity 
about the cause and relevance of environmental events. These cognitive biases and the 
use of cognitive distortions, likely made worse during the experience of negative emotion 
such as depression or anxiety (Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, Freeman, & Bebbington, 2001), 
influence normal processes of belief formation. Coupled with a previously existing 
dysfunctional self-concept or negative self-schema and the onslaught of environmental 
stress, criticism, or the fear of hurt from others, attempts are likely made to neutralize the 
activation of negative beliefs about self by creating compensatory delusions that take on 
the characteristics of excessive grandiosity or paranoia.
While these theories of delusion formation may appear quite complex and 
detailed, relatively straightforward interventions based in cognitive therapy with roots in 
this theory have been found to be effective in reducing delusional ideation in individuals 
with schizophrenia. Borrowing cognitive therapy techniques from the treatment o f other 
disorders such as depression and anxiety, specific belief modification interventions for 
delusions include psychoeducation (educating the patients about the symptoms and
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course of schizophrenia and/or delusions), collaborative empiricism (a therapist-client 
“teamwork” perspective regarding the questioning and testing of beliefs and behaviors), 
plarmed reality testing (experimentation used to help the client discover new ways to 
cope with negative thoughts and modify beliefs), normalizing (de-stigmatizing symptoms 
by examining them through rational argument), and verbal challenge in the form of 
evidence examination (encouraging the client to view a delusion as only one possible 
way to interpret events; Alford & Beck, 1994; Chadwick & Lowe, 1994). These 
techniques have been effective in reducing the conviction of delusions, as well as the 
subjective distress that inevitably accompanies them.
Cognitive Treatment and Cognitive Vulnerability o f Individuals at Risk
Given the complex and persistent nature of delusions and the emotional suffering 
that they often cause, as well as the overall debilitating effects of schizophrenia, it is 
worthwhile to attempt to find ways to prevent the onslaught of delusions and therefore, 
presumably florid psychosis in individuals who may be at risk to develop the disorder. 
The recent emergence of efficacy data on cognitive interventions for schizophrenia shows 
potential (Kingdon & Turkington, 1994; Kuipers et al, 1997; Rector, Seeman, & Segal, 
2003; Sensky et al, 2000; Tarrier, Beckett, Harwood, Baker, Yusupoff, & Ugaarteburu, 
1993) and may contribute to a model for use of these techniques in an at-risk population. 
As the goal of at-risk intervention studies is primary prevention of schizophrenia, or at a 
minimum, delay of the disorder’s onset, the use of psychological interventions has been 
suggested for this population (Yung, et al., 1998; Morrison, et al., 1998). Unfortunately,
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there appears to be only one completed study of a cognitive therapy intervention with 
individuals at risk for schizophrenia, but results look promising. In a series of case 
studies of a homogenous group of clients at risk (as defined by the Yung et al., 1998 
criteria), French, Morrison, Walford, Knight, & Bentall (2003) utilized various cognitive 
therapy techniques such as selective attention strategies, belief modification, and the 
manipulation of safety behaviors within a problem-solving context. They found that two 
of the three subjects responded well to the interventions, and that their transient and 
attenuated psychotic symptoms diminished.
Morrison and colleagues (2002) are currently in the midst of conducting a much 
needed randomized controlled trial of cognitive therapy for individuals at high risk (using 
the Yung et al., 1998 criteria) for schizophrenia. While preliminary results of treatment 
efficacy are not yet available, these researchers have attempted to tap into areas of 
cognitive vulnerability in these subjects, a strategy that has not previously been employed 
with high-risk individuals. This study used the Meta-Cognitions Questionnaire (MCQ; 
Cartwright-Hatton, & Wells, 1997), a measure that examines beliefs about internal 
cognitive events (“meta-cognitions” generally defined as “cognitions about cognitions”) 
and has been shown to correlate with measures of psychotic-like symptoms in non­
patients (Morrison & Wells, 2000). The questionnaire measures negative beliefs about 
the controllability of thoughts (“I carmot ignore my worrying thoughts”), levels of 
cognitive confidence (“I have a poor memory”), general negative beliefs about thoughts 
such as superstition and punishment (“If I did not control a worrying thought, and then it 
happened, it would be my fault”), and levels of cognitive self-consciousness (“I pay close
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attention to the way my mind works”). The researchers found that the at-risk sample had 
significantly higher scores on these subscales than the control group. Morrison has 
posited that negative meta-cognitions play an important role in the development of 
positive symptoms like delusions, and the high scores on this measure were interpreted as 
support for this theory.
In addition, these researchers administered the Sociotropy-Autonomy Scale 
(Beck, Epstein, & Harrison, 1983b). Related to Blatt and colleagues’ (2001) constructs 
of “anaclitic” (concern with interpersonal relationships) and “introjective” (concern with 
securing a positive sense of self) dimensions of depression. Beck et al. (1983a) suggest 
that the traits of sociotropy (or social dependence) and autonomy (need for independent 
goal attainment) influence one’s perception of and interaction with the world, and may 
act as predisposing factors in the development and maintenance of depressive symptoms. 
According to Morrison and colleagues, this measure was included in their study as an 
assessment of dysfunctional self-schemata. On the two subscales, Sociotropy, measured 
as levels of fear of rejection and criticism, and Autonomy, measured as levels of self­
demands of accomplishment and control, subjects reported how closely statements 
regarding these two areas described them. It was found that the at-risk sample scored 
significantly higher than the control group on the Sociotropy subscale, but not on the 
Autonomy subscale. The finding of higher scores on Sociotropy in the at-risk group is an 
important one, and is consistent with previously described theories of delusion formation 
(Beck & Rector, 2002; Bentall, 2001) which suggest that delusions may function as 
defenses against threatened self-esteem, as such elements of dysfunctional self-concept
33
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
are often triggered as a result of criticism from or negative interactions with others.
Preliminary findings in the schizophrenia treatment literature suggest the 
feasibility of reducing or preventing delusion formation using cognitive techniques, and 
the at-risk literature has demonstrated that researchers can measure specific forms of 
cognitive vulnerability. Given these two promising yet limited research advances, a 
clearer, more detailed assessment of aspects of cognitive vulnerability in individuals at 
risk for psychosis is warranted, with an eye toward defining specific foci for intervention.
The Present Study
The purposes of the present study were multifaceted. As prevention of 
schizophrenia is clearly an important and possibly feasible goal, this research built on the 
work of Yung and colleagues (1998) as a continuation of the use of “trait plus state” 
factors in order to measure variables related to risk for psychosis. Additionally, as 
previously described, components of cognitive vulnerability have been discovered in 
individuals with schizophrenia, and in order to prevent breakdown, it is therefore 
necessary to examine more closely these subsets of dysfunctional cognitions in 
individuals at risk. Although Morrison and colleagues (2002) pioneered this particular 
line of research, their investigation into the details of cognitive vulnerabilities was 
limited, as the MCQ does not quite seem to tap into negative self-schemas or 
dysfunctional attitudes; and, the Sociotropy-Autonomy scale is narrow in scope, as it only 
examines to two specific facets of self-schemas. There appear to be additional areas of 
cognitive vulnerability to study that have not yet been pursued in the literature. While
34
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
several researchers have implicated abnormal attributional style (the self-serving bias) in 
the development of schizophrenia, there have been no studies to date looking at this 
pattern in individuals at risk, and as previously mentioned, only one (Morrison et al. 
2002) has investigated negative self-schemata.
This research examined more specific facets of cognitive vulnerability, such as 
attributional style, cognitive distortion, and negative self-schemata in individuals at risk 
for psychosis. This study departed from Yung and colleagues (1998) and Morrison and 
colleagues (2002) in that it was not a prospective investigation examining rate of 
transition to full-blown psychosis; instead low-level delusional ideation was used as the 
dependent variable. Utilizing presence and type of delusions as the dependent variable 
seemed appropriate, given the prevalence of this symptom, as well as its 
phenomenological importance and significance as a cognitive process. Both general 
cognitive vulnerability and specific components were examined in their ability to predict 
low-level delusional ideation in general, as well as more specific types, in particular 
delusions of persecution and delusions of grandeur. The study examined specific types of 
cognitive vulnerability in individuals at risk for schizophrenia (as well as in a control 
group, for comparison purposes) in order to identify how dysfunctional thinking 
pattems/negative self-schemata and attributional style predicted specific delusion types. 
With thorough investigation of these potentially related areas, this research adds to the 
literature on cognitive processes, on risk to psychosis, and on delusional ideation. It is 
hoped that knowledge about specific cognitive vulnerabilities in individuals at risk will 
aid clinicians in developing particular interventions to target and modify these
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dysfunctional, unhealthy beliefs before they lead to full-blown delusions, thus preventing 
the pervasive nature of this symptom and its relationship to overall deterioration in 
functioning.
Based on a review of the literature and the rationale for the present study, the 
following hypothesis were tested:
1. Individuals who are categorized as “at-risk” (using a modified version of the 
Yung et al. criteria) have signifieantly higher levels of overall cognitive 
vulnerability (e.g., more dysfunctional attitudes, more pronounced negative 
self-schemas) than do those in the control group.
2. At-risk individuals exhibit an attributional style similar to that found in the 
literature with schizophrenia patients (external attributions for negative events 
and internal attributions for positive events), and this attributional style differs 
significantly from the attributional style of the control group.
3. At-risk individuals have significantly higher levels of delusional ideation than 
those in the control group. The exhibited ideation can be divided into 
persecutory and grandiose delusion components.
4. Participants’ levels of overall cognitive vulnerability possessed, as measured 
by the IPSAQ and the DAS (see Measures in Methods section) are 
significantly positively correlated with the degree of delusional ideation 
exhibited in both groups.
5. Specific risk factors (e.g. genetic risk, high score on general psychopathology
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measure, age in early 20s, etc.) are related to level of delusional ideation, and 
certain combinations of these aforementioned risk factors are significantly 
more predictive of delusional ideation than other combinations.
6. There is an interaction between the level of risk for psychosis — as determined 
by a “risk score” (discussed below) — and level of cognitive vulnerability/ 
specific attributional style in predicting delusional ideation. Inclusion of the 
interaction of the two accounts for a significantly larger proportion of the 
variance in ideation than does either variable alone.
Method
Participants
Participants for this study comprised two distinct groups: The At-Risk Group and 
the Control Group. Characteristics of subjects and recruitment strategies are described 
below. Results from a power analysis, conducted with the Sample Power (Borenstein, 
Rothstein, & Cohen, 1997) computer program to determine the appropriate n for each 
group, revealed that a sample size of 50 per group was necessary to have adequate power 
(.70) to detect group differences. The total n for this study was 133 (61 in the At-Risk 
Group and 72 in the Control Group). Gender and age matching procedures are described 
below.
At-Risk Group
Inclusion criteria for the At-Risk Group were based on those outlined in Yung et 
al. (1998) and Morrison et al. (2002) and modified slightly for the sake of feasibility and
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practicality in this research. Subjects in this group who reported having a first-degree 
relative (sibling, parent, or child), second degree relative (aunt/uncle, grandparent), or 
third degree relative (cousin, great-aunt/uncle, great-grandparent) with a history of any 
DSM-IV diagnosis of any psychotic disorder (e.g.. Schizophrenia, Sehizoaffective 
disorder. Delusional disorder. Schizophreniform disorder. Schizotypal personality 
disorder, and Psychosis NOS) were selected for participation in the study. As it was not 
feasible to confirm reported family member diagnosis with an assessment or chart 
review, participants were included in the study based on their report alone. Furthermore, 
as it was not possible to confirm specific family member symptoms and whether or not 
those symptoms truly were indieative of the six targeted Psychotic Spectrum Disorders, 
endorsed symptoms were not used in isolation to determine whether an individual 
qualified as having a psychotic relative. Thus, subjects were included in the At-Risk 
Group only if they endorsed being certain that their family member was diagnosed with 
one of the six listed psychotic disorders (in addition to other criteria described below); if 
they in addition happened to report the existence of relatives’ specific psychotic 
symptoms (as was most often the case), that was also acceptable for entrance into the At- 
Risk Group. Thus, inclusion criteria for the present study’s At-Risk Group was in some 
ways narrower than the Yung et al. (1998) criteria (e.g., BLIPS not included) and in some 
ways wider (e.g., partieipants could have either 2" ,̂ or 3"̂*̂ degree relatives).
At-Risk participants were between the ages of 18 and 36 years old, which is an 
age-range targeted in other at-risk studies (e.g., Morrison, et al, 2002). In addition, many 
At-Risk Group subjects also had an elevated score on the study’s measure of general
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psychopathology, the Outcome Questionnaire (OQ-45.2; Lambert & Burlingame, 1996); 
in fact, approximately 52% of At-Risk subjects had OQ scores in the clinical (raw score 
greater than or equal to 63) or subclinical range (raw score between 57 and 62). Data 
from this subset of subjects were included in a series of level of risk-to-psychosis 
analyses described below in the Results section. Of the 61 At-Risk subjeets included in 
this study, 27.9% {n = 17) reported having a first degree relative with a psychotic 
disorder, 55.7% {n = 34) reported having a second degree relative, and 16.4% (n = 10) 
reported having a third degree relative.
Control Group
The Control Group was composed entirely of undergraduates from the University 
of Montana Introductory Psychology subject pool. These subjects also participated in the 
initial eourse “screening” and were given the same survey as those who were in the At- 
Risk group (survey details described in Procedure section below). The Control Group 
subjects were randomly chosen from a subgroup of screening subjects who reported not 
having any family history of any DSM-IV psychotic disorder, nor suspecting any 
psychotic symptoms in their family members, and who were between the ages of 18 and 
36 years old. In addition, after eompleting the questionnaires, potential Control Group 
members whose Outcome Questionnaire scores exceeded the elinical eutoff score 
delineated in the manual (raw scores greater than or equal to 63) were excluded from the 
analyses (approximately 5 potential Control Group subjects were excluded for this 
reason).
Subjects were matched for gender and age aeross groups. To achieve this, all
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participating screening questionnaires were initially sorted into two categories: those 
from subjects who endorsed having a relative with a psyehotie disorder, and those who 
did not. Then, screening measures were sorted by gender and age range within each 
group. For each At-Risk Group member to be included in the study, a Control Group 
member of the same gender and age range was randomly ehosen as well. Results 
indicate no significant gender differenees, (1, « = 133) =. 20, p  = .66; age differences, t 
(131) = .93,p  = .36; or ethnicity differences, (1, « = 133) =. l l , p  = .74 between 
groups. There was however, a significant between-group difference in marital status 
(ever-married vs. never-married), X  ̂(1, n = 133) = 3.84, p  = .05 as At-Risk Group 
subjects were more often married and Control Group subjects were more often single. 
Demographic data for all study participants are shown in Table 3.
Measures
Cognitive Vulnerabilitv Measures
Attributional style was assessed using The Intemal, Personal, and Situational 
Attributions Questionnaire (IPSAQ; Kinderman & Bentall, 1996). This measure was 
designed in response to criticism of low intemal consistency in the commonly-used 
Attributional Style Questionnaire (ASQ; Peterson, Semmel, Von Baeyer, Abramson, 
Metalsky, & Seligman, 1982); it has been suggested that the intemality subscale produces 
the least reliable scores on the ASQ (as well as on the related EASQ; Metalsky, 
Halberstadt, & Abramson, 1987), which is a problem given that for research with 
disorders other than depression (e.g., psychosis), the intemality scale is generally the one
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of interest (Kinderman & Bentall, 1996).
The IPSAQ has 32 items and measures attrihutions for both positive and negative 
social situations via a fill-in response and then a categorization of the causality of each 
particular event using a multiple-choice format. An example scenario is: “A friend 
betrayed the trust you had in her. What caused your friend to betray your trust?” (Subject 
writes in brief response). “Is this a.) something about you?, b.) something about the other 
person or other people?, or c.) something about the situation (circumstances or ehance)?” 
Six subscales are calculated to reflect the different types of attributional styles (e.g., 
intemal attributions for positive events, extemal attributions toward people for positive 
events, extemal attributions toward situations for positive events, intemal for negative 
events, extemal toward people for negative events, and extemal toward situations for 
negative events). As the purpose of the present study was to evaluate the attributional 
style demonstrated in an at-risk group and draw theoretical comparisons to individuals 
with psychosis, only the two subscales relevant to that particular “delusional” 
attributional style were used in the analyses; intemal attrihutions for positive events and 
extemal attributions toward people for negative events. The authors of the scale suggest 
constmcting “ bias” scores from these subscales in order to reflect common cognitive 
biases described in the literature, “Extemalizing Bias (EB)” and “Personalizing Bias 
(PB)” (Kinderman & Bentall, 1996). These scores were calculated in this study; 
however, they were not used in the analyses as the guidelines for correct interpretation 
that was provided by the authors were unclear. Thus, only the “intemal positive” 
subscale and the “extemal personal negative” subscale were used in the analyses.
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Of note is that the developers of the scale, in a follow-up article (Kinderman, 
Kaney, Morley, & Bentall, under review), highlighted the importance of scoring the 
f f  SAQ items based solely on the subjects’ own causality ratings, and not modifying them 
to reflect the ratings of an independent observer. For example, a deluded subject may 
perceive the cause of a particular event as “caused by me,” whereas an independent 
observer would clearly interpret the response as “caused by circumstances.” In their 
article, the authors note that while there may not be discrepancies between the deluded 
subjects’ descriptions of the actual causes of the events and those of the independent 
rater, but that the discrepancies apparently emerge in the subjects “attributions about their 
attributions” (Kinderman et al., under review, p. 2). Thus, it is not the deluded subjects’ 
specific indicated cause of the event (e.g. Q: “A friend gave you a ride home;” A: 
“because the bus broke down”) that is per se abnormal or significantly different from 
non-deluded subjects’ responses, but it is their perception of who or what causes the 
reason for the event taking place that is noteworthy.
In the validation study using an rmdergraduate sample, internal consistency was 
acceptable (ranging from .61 and .76 for the six suhscales) and improved as compared to 
the intemality subscales of the original ASQ (reported by Kinderman and Bentall as 
ranging fi-om .39 and .52). In this study, the alpha coefficient for the overall scale items 
was .81; for the internal positive suhscale and the external personal negative subscale, 
alpha coefficients were .74 and .80, respectively. As regards the measure’s validity, both 
clinical and analogue studies have found that IPSAQ scores were significantly associated 
with the ASQ’s intemality suhscales, and were also highly correlated with levels of
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paranoid ideation (Kinderman & Bentall, 1997).
Negative self-schemas were assessed using the Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale 
(DAS; Weissman, & Beck, 1978), a 40-item self-report questionnaire on a seven-point 
Likert scale ranging from “totally agree” to “totally disagree” that measures one’s 
expectations about desired outcomes (“My life is wasted unless I am a success”), concern 
with the evaluations of others (“I cannot be happy unless most people I know admire 
me”), and attachment of importance to certain goals (“It is difficult to be happy unless 
one is good looking, intelligent, rich, and creative”). It is suggested that this 
questiormaire taps negative self-schemas as well as elements of cognitive distortions. A 
total score is obtained by summing the value corresponding to the choice endorsed for 
each item, and there are no subscales. Reliability in the validation sample of patients and 
non-patients was adequate, with alpha coefficients ranging from .89 to .92 (Weissman, 
1979, cited in Hammen & Krantz, 1985). In this study’s sample, the alpha coefficient 
was .92. Dobson and Breiter’s 1981 validation study (as cited in Beck, Epstein, & 
Harrison, 1983) found that the DAS was correlated r = .36 with the original Beck 
Depression Inventory (Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, and Erbaugh, 1961) and r = .43 
with the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire (Hollon & Kendall, 1980). Beck’s initial 
validation study, based on a sample of undergraduates, found comparable correlations 
between the DAS and measures of cognitive distortion commonly used at that time 
(Beck, Epstein, & Harrison, 1983).
Delusions Assessment
Delusional ideation was assessed using a modified version of the Peters et al.
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Delusions Inventory (Gottlieb, Schuldberg, Peters, & Caruso, unpublished manuscript). 
The original version (PDI; Peters, Joseph, & Garety, 1999) is a 40 item self-report 
questionnaire that measures delusions in the normal or “subclinical” population. 
Examinees are presented with a question, such as, “Do you ever feel as if there are forces 
around you which affect you in strange ways?” Subjects must initially mark “yes” or 
“no” for each item. If the answer is “yes,” subjects are then asked to indicate: (I) the 
level of distress their belief causes, (2) their level of preoccupation with the belief, and 
(3) their level of conviction that the belief is true, all corresponding to five-point Likert 
scales (with anchors of “not at all distressing,” “hardly ever think about it,” “don’t 
believe it’s true” to “very distressing,” “think about it all the time,” “believe it’s 
absolutely true” on the three scales). The original version includes subscale scores that 
are calculated by adding the Likert ratings of each subscale for the items; however, 
subscales were not used in the present study. Instead, an overall score was calculated by 
adding the subscale scores, as well as the initial yes-no item, to come up with a composite 
delusional ideation score.
Cronbach’s a  for data scored with the present method from a previous study with 
an undergraduate student sample was calculated as .90 (Gottlieb, 2001, unpublished 
manuscript). Criterion validity with the original PDI was established with the norming 
sample, as a deluded inpatient psychiatric sample scored significantly higher on the PDI 
than a non-psychiatric normative sample (Peters, Joseph, & Garety, 1999). In addition, 
concurrent validity has been demonstrated within the normative sample, with scores on 
the PDI correlated with scores on other delusional ideation measures (the Magical
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Ideation Scale, Eckblad and Chapman, 1983; the Schizotypal Personality Scale, Claridge 
& Broks, 1984; and the Delusions Symptom-State Inventory; DSSI, Foulds & Bedford, 
1975). In the revision study (Gottlieb et al.), a significant correlation between the 
shortened PDI total score and the DSSI total score was found {r = .19, p  = .002, between 
the new PDI Grandiosity subscale and the DSSI Grandiosity subscale (r = .26, p  < .001, 
and between the new PDI Persecutory subscale and the DSSI Persecutory subseale (r = 
.\A ,p = .Q2).
Due to inconsistencies in results from previous factor analyses and the lack of 
clear categories of delusional ideation, a revised version of this measure was created 
(Gottlieb, et al., unpublished manuscript) in order be in keeping with the most common 
categories of ideation (persecutory and grandiose) and to create a more parsimonious 
assessment (details of this modification are presented elsewhere; see Gottlieb et al., 
unpublished manuscript). The shortened measure has a slightly different scoring system 
(which involves recalibrating the Likert items to range from 0-4 instead of 1-5 and 
collapsing the subscale totals for each item and the initial yes-no item into one composite 
item score) and contains eight items which factor into two subscales (Grandiosity and 
Persecution) when used with the undergraduate sample from the revision study. As 
preliminary analyses of this measure with that sample demonstrated adequate 
psychometric properties (Gottlieb, Schuldberg, & Caruso, unpublished data), the present 
study utilized both the original 40-item measure (for breadth) as well as the newly 
shortened and revised measure (factor analysis with the present study’s sample described
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below). Alpha coefficients for the original measure (with the overall score), the 
shortened version (total score), and the Grandiose and Persecutory subscales in this 
present study were .89, .67, .56, and .72, respectively.
In order to examine the factor structure of the shortened 8-item version of the PDI 
with this At-Risk sample and to ascertain whether these eight items factored into the 
eommon delusional themes categories of Persecutory and Grandiose, confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA) was conducted using the AMOS computer package (Arbuckle, 1997).
The items and the scoring of the original PDI were modified, retaining 8 of the original 
40 items, categorized into the two modified subscales. Details of the procedure of the 
selection of the items are presented elsewhere (Gottlieb, et al., unpublished manuscript). 
Both orthogonal (imcorrelated factors) and oblique (correlated factors) models for the 
two-factor shortened measure were tested. While CFA results from the original Gottlieb 
et al. revision study found that the oblique model was a significantly better fit than the 
orthogonal model, in the present study there was no statistically significant difference 
between the two (1, A=61) = 0.51,p  > .10. Aecording to the chi-square fit test, 
neither the oblique, (19, N = 6\) = 36.63, p  = .01 nor the orthogonal, (20, A=61) = 
37.13,/) = .01, were a particularly good fit for the data; however, each was significantly 
better-fitting than the independence model, oblique: X^ A (9, N  =61) = 88.96,/) < .001, 
orthogonal: X^ A (8, A =61) = 88.45,/) < .001. fri addition to the chi-square tests, two 
other fit indices, “the goodness of fit index (GFI)” and the “adjusted goodness o f fit index 
(AGFI)” were used to compare each model to the independence model. The “root mean 
square error of approximation (RMSEA)” was also calculated in order to determine the
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discrepancy between the observed covariances in the data and those predicted in the 
model. Specifically, the GFI compares each model to the independence model and 
ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values (especially over.90 or .95) indicating a good fit. 
RMSEA values of equal to or less than .05 are considered indicative of good fit; .08 is 
considered adequate. See Table 5 for summary fit statistics and Figure 1 for the two- 
factor oblique model.
Despite not meeting the absolute strictest criteria for “good fit” on the basis of 
these fit indices, which may be due to a fairly small n in this At-Risk Group, the internal 
consistency coefficient for the Persecutory subscale is more is adequate (.72). The 
Grandiosity subscale’s alpha coefficient is slightly lower than expected (.56) and 
therefore results utilizing this subscale as a criterion variable (see Hypothesis 6) should 
be considered exploratory and interpreted with caution.
Assessment of General Psychopathology
The Outcome Questionnaire (OQ-45.2; Lambert & Burlingame, 1996), a 45-item 
self-report measure, was used to assess levels of psychological symptoms in study 
subjects. Although designed to measure client progress in therapy, this measure is also 
used in research studies, as it is relatively brief and easy to complete. The OQ-45.2 
assesses a range of common symptoms that occur within a wide variety of psychological 
conditions and also provides information about a person’s interpersonal relationships, 
current stress and distress, and performance in social roles.
The OQ is composed of a total score and three subscales: Symptom Distress 
(SD), Interpersonal Relations (IR), and Social Roles (SR). The developers of the scale
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suggest utilizing a cut-off score of greater than or equal to a raw score of 63 (the scale has 
a possible score range of 0 - 180) to distinguish between clinical and non-clinical groups, 
and this cut-off score was used as exclusionary criteria for the Control Group. Analyses 
from normative samples of undergraduates and patients demonstrate test-retest reliability 
coefficients of .84 for the OQ Total, and coefficients ranging from .78 to .82 for the OQ 
subscales. The internal consistency alpha for the OQ Total was .93 for both students and 
patients, and the OQ subscales coefficients ranged from .70 to .92 across both sample 
groups. Concurrent validity for this same sample was demonstrated as Pearson 
correlations between the OQ and several other well-established symptom measures (e.g., 
SCL-90, Derogatis, 1977; BDI, Beck et al., 1961; State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, 
Spielberger, 1983; Social Adjustment Scale, Weissman & Bothwell, 1976; etc.) were all 
significant beyond the /» < .01 level. In the present study, the alpha coefficients for the 
OQ-45 were as follows: .93 for the total score, .93 for Symptom Distress, .79 for 
Interpersonal Relations, and .61 for Social Roles.
Procedure
The participants who completed this study (within both the At-Risk and Control 
Groups) were recruited from the University of Montana undergraduate Introductory 
Psychology course subject pool. Approximately 1000 potential subjects (about 550 from 
Fall Semester course and 462 from Spring Semester course) were assessed with a paper 
and pencil measure during a course “screening day.” This screening tool was developed 
for use specifically to screen participants for this particular study and included questions
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addressing potential subjects’ knowledge about the mental health of their family 
members (e.g., specific diagnoses of specific biological relatives, 
characteristics/traits/symptoms of specific relatives, etc) as well as their willingness to 
participate in a future study for course credit or monetary compensation ($10) if their 
course credit requirements had already been filled at the time of their future recruitment.
Follow-up phone calls were made to subjects who met inclusion criteria (as 
previously described) by one undergraduate research assistant who followed a script and 
who was blind to subjects’ group membership (e.g. At-Risk or Control Group). These 
subjects were invited to attend one session, where they completed the questionnaires 
described in the Measures section. Undergraduate research assistants, who were in charge 
of the data collection sessions, also were blind to the participants’ group membership.
All subjects consented to participation and completed their questionnaire packets in 
individual rooms to ensure privacy. After completion of the questionnaires, participants 
received written debriefing information and a phone list of mental health referral services 
in the area. All subjects received course credit for their participation. Those who were 
no longer in need of course credit received $10.
Unfortunately, although discussed in the planning stages of this research, an 
essential question involving the participants’ own history of psychosis was inadvertently 
omitted from the measures administered. As this information is important to the 
conceptualization o f the subjects as either “at-risk” or “not at risk” for psychosis, there 
was an attempt to recontact the 133 participants to obtain consent to gather this important 
mental health history information. An email was sent to 105 subjects asking for
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permission to telephone them to ask them this question and 26 were sent a written letter 
by mail (when an email address was not available) with the same request. Two subjects 
were not recontacted because they had not provided an email address or regular mailing 
address and making contact via telephone was not permitted by the IRB. Of those 130 
sent the email or regular mail request, 48 replied and consented to the phone call (37%). 
Forty-three of those 48 consenting subjects were reached by phone (90%) and all of them 
denied any history of psychosis.
While the response rate/successful recontact rate of these subjects was fairly low 
(about 1/3 of the entire sample), all of those who were recontacted denied a history of 
psychosis. Given the base rate of psychosis in the general population (approximately 1%; 
APA, 2000), the chance that Control Group subjects in this study would report a history 
of past psychosis is approximately 1 in 100 («=72). In the At-Risk Group, the chance is a 
bit higher (Gottesman, 1991); however, the statistical likelihood of individuals in this 
young age range having already had a previous psychotic episode is rather small. Thus, 
while lack of full response (and therefore denial of psychosis history) from participants 
precludes the certain determination of the pureness of the data, it may be assumed with 
reasonable confidence that the At-Risk Group is representative of a “true” risk group and 
the Control Group is comprised of individuals without risk to psychosis as defined by this 
research.
An attempt was made to recruit At-Risk participants from the University 
Counseling Center (serving University students) and the Clinical Psychology Center 
(serving the Missoula community). Therapists at these locations were given a description
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of the study as well as copies of a recruitment letter to distribute to their clients.
Interested clients were then directed to call the study’s voicemail number and leave a 
confidential message with contact information in order to receive a follow-up phone call 
to confirm inclusion criteria (participant’s age, diagnosis of biological relative) and set an 
appointment to complete the questionnaires. Flyers describing the study were also posted 
at both of these locations, as well as in the main lobby of the Curry Health Center (see 
Appendix 2). One potential University Counseling center referral subject called the 
voicemail; however, she did not meet the inclusion criteria for the study, as she reported 
that she did not believe that her biological relative formally received a diagnosis of one of 
the DSM-IV psychotic disorders. After the data collection portion of the study closed, 
two individuals referred from the Clinical Psychology Center called the voicemail. One 
of these subjects is in the process of completing the questionnaires; the other has not yet 
made an appointment to participate in the study. Due to the late date of these referrals, the 
data from these two individuals were not included in the present analyses. Thus, all 61 
At-Risk participants (and, as previously mentioned, all 72 Control Group members) who 
completed the study were recruited from the Introductory Psychology Course pool.
Results
Reliability analyses and descriptive data from all questionnaires administered are 
displayed in Table 4. As predicted, members of the At-Risk Group demonstrated 
significantly higher levels of dysfunctional attitudes and more pronounced negative self­
schemas as measured by the DAS than did members of the Control Group (Hypothesis
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1), t (131) = 3.48, = .001 with a medium effect size {d= .58). The At-Risk Group, as 
predicted (Hypothesis 3) also had significantly higher levels of overall delusional 
ideation (PDI) than did the Control Group, t (131) = 3.33,p  = .001, with a medium effect 
size (d ^  .56). In addition, there were between-group differences for persecutory 
ideation: t(131) = 2.51,/» = .01 and grandiose ideation: t (131) = 2.29, p  = .02, also with 
medium effect sizes (d = .43 and d = .39, respectively).
A 2 (Group) by 2 (Attributional Bias) mixed factorial ANOVA analysis revealed 
a main effect for positive event biases: across groups, individuals made significantly 
more internal attributions than external attributions for positive events, F (I, 131) =
94.92, p  < .0001. There was no main effect for Group in attributional style for positive 
events, F ( l ,  131) = 1.62,/» = .21, and no Group by attributional style interaction for 
positive events,/’(I, \3 l)  = \ .\A ,p  = .29.
An additional 2 by 2 mixed factorial ANOVA demonstrated that there was no 
significant main effect for negative event biases, F ( l ,  131) = .01,/> = .94, as individuals 
made a comparable amount of internal attributions as external attributions regarding the 
cause of negative events. There was also no main effect for Group: participants in the 
Control Group and the At-Risk Group did not significantly differ on attributional style for 
negative events, F ( l ,  131) = .23,p  = .63, and there was no Group by attributional style 
interaction for negative events, F  {\, 131) = .26, p  = .61. These findings suggest that At- 
Risk individuals do not demonstrate significantly different attributional biases from the 
Control Group, for positive or for negative events.
As regards the relationship between negative self-schema, attributional style, and
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delusional ideation (Hypothesis 4), significant positive Pearson Product-Moment 
correlations emerged between dysfunctional attitudes/negative self-schema (DAS scores) 
and delusional ideation (r = .3S,p < .0001), but not between the predicted attributional 
style scores (internal attributions for positive events: r = .04, p  = .61, and external 
attributions toward people for negative events: r  = -.04, p  = .67) and delusions. When 
these analyses were conducted for the At-Risk Group alone, stronger correlations were 
found between dysfunctional attitudes and delusions (r = .49, p <  .0001), but again no 
significant relationships were observed between attributional style variables and overall 
delusional ideation (internal positive: r = .20, p  = .12; extemal negative toward people: 
r  = -.04, p  = .76).
When correlating the newly created PDI subscales (Grandiose and Persecutory) 
with the IPSAQ subscales and the DAS in the full study sample, no significant 
relationships emerged between either PDI subscale and these cognitive variables. 
However, within the At-Risk Group, there were significant associations between 
Persecutory delusions and the IPSAQ internal attributions for positive events subscale 
(r = .20, p  = .04) and between Persecutory delusions and the DAS score {r = .34, p  < .01). 
There were no correlations between the Grandiose subscale and the cognitive variables.
In both the total sample and the At-Risk Group analyses, there were no significant 
relationships between dysfunctional attitudes/negative self-schema and attributional style. 
See Tables 6a and 6b for Pearson correlations among relevant study variables.
To analyze the specific risk factors most predictive of delusional ideation in the 
At-Risk Group, a series of hierarchical regression equations were conducted with the
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various risk factors (degree of genetic risk, OQ-45 score, age) used alone and in 
combination as predictor variables and PDI score used as the criterion variable. Total 
score on OQ-45 was entered first into the equation and was found to be significantly 
related to delusional ideation (R^ = .40,/? < .0001). Degree of genetic risk (reporting 
either a 1®‘, or 3'̂ ‘’ degree relative with a psychotic disorder, coded as 3: highest degree 
of genetic risk, 2: medium degree of genetic risk, and 1: lowest degree of genetic risk, 
respectively) was entered second and was found to contribute significantly to the variance 
in PDI scores over and above OQ score alone {R^ A = .06, p  = .02). Age was entered 
third into the equation and did not add any explained variance to the criterion {R  ̂A = .00, 
p  = .68), nor did the interaction of degree of genetic risk and OQ score, which was 
entered fifth into the equation {R  ̂A = .00, p  = .65), or the genetic risk by OQ score by 
age interaction, entered sixth {R  ̂A = .00, p  = .55). See Table 7 for results of hierarchical 
regression analyses.
It appeared that OQ score was the strongest predictor of PDI scores, followed by 
degree of genetic risk, and the two variables together additively contributed to 
approximately 45% of the variance in delusions. From the results of this hierarchical 
regression equation, a “risk score” for each At-Risk subject was calculated using different 
combinations of OQ scores (e.g. greater than or equal to the 63-point cutoff = greater 
risk; less than or equal to the 63-point cutoff =less risk) and degree of genetic risk (e.g.,
D* degree, degree, 3*̂*̂ degree), such that having an OQ score equal to or exceeding 63 
in combination with a degree relative with psychosis equaled the “highest” level of 
risk with a “risk score” of six, and having an OQ score below 63 in combination with a
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3'̂ '’ degree relative equaled the “lowest” level of risk with a risk score of one. See Table 8 
for more detailed calculations of the “risk score.”
To test the hypothesis that the combination of certain risk factors and heightened 
cognitive vulnerability (conceptualized as dysfunctional attitudes/negative self-schema 
and dysfunctional attributional style) best predicted both general and specific types of 
delusional ideation, multiple regression analyses were calculated for the At-Risk Group. 
As a way to hone in on specific vulnerability variables in this group, and to create a more 
stringent test for risk, these analyses were conducted with data from the At-Risk Group 
only. Subjects’ risk scores were used as predictors in conjunction with DAS scores and 
IPSAQ scores to predict PDI scores (used as the criterion variable) (Hypothesis 6). From 
the regression analysis utilizing risk score and DAS score as predictors, it was found that 
the two variables together predicted 24% of the variance in PDI scores {p = .001), and 
that there was no significant interaction among risk and DAS score A = .00,/> = .79).
To examine the relationship between risk and attributional style in predicting 
delusions, subjects’ risk scores and the relevant IPSAQ subscales (internal attributions for 
positive events, extemal attributions toward people for negative events) were entered into 
separate regression equations. When the risk score and intemal attributions for positive 
events were entered together as predictors, they did not contribute significantly to the 
variance in total PDI scores over and above the risk score’s contribution alone, which 
was 7.5% (R^ A = .Q>3,p = .18), nor did the interaction of the two variables A = .00, 
p ^ m ) .
When extemal attributions toward people for negative events and the risk score
55
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
were entered together, they did not contribute significantly to the variance in PDI over 
and above the risk score alone {R  ̂A = .00, p =.77). Although there was no main effect for 
this IPSAQ subscale, when the interaction of the two variables was entered into the 
equation, the eontributed variance in PDI scores jumped from 7.7% to 16% {R  ̂A = .08,/? 
= .02) which suggests that this type of attributional style has a moderating effect on the 
relationship between risk and delusional ideation. See Table 9 for detailed results of 
these regression equations.
In order to understand the relationship between risk for psyehosis, cognitive 
vulnerability, and specific types of delusions, additional multiple regression equations 
with these same predictor variables and different criterion variables were eondueted. The 
criterion variables (Persecutory delusions and Grandiose delusions) were the two 
subscales of the shortened 8-item PDI calculated on the basis of the confirmatory factor 
analysis and were entered separately as downstream variables for eaeh analysis. In the 
present analyses, these delusion categories were utilized as unit weights, not as weights 
based on factor loadings. While the risk score alone was not significantly correlated with 
Persecutory delusions (r = 22>,p = .07), the DAS in combination with the risk score 
predicted a significant amount of variance in Persecutory delusions {R  ̂= A 2 ,p  = .04), 
with no interaction effect (R^ A = .03, p  = .20). There were no significant main effects 
and no interaction effect for the DAS and risk score in predieting Grandiose delusions.
When risk score and IPSAQ subscales regression equations were calculated to 
predict the two types of delusions, it was found that there was a trend toward significance 
for the combination of the intemal attributions for positive events subscale and the risk
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score {R  ̂= . \ \ , p  = .058) in predicting Persecutory delusions, but that extemal 
attributions toward people for negative events (neither alone nor in conjunction with risk) 
did not contribute to this type of delusion. Examining Grandiose delusions, there was no 
significant predictive relationship between risk and intemal attributions for positive 
events {R  ̂= .00,/» = .51). Although there were no main effects for risk or extemal 
attributions toward people for negative events alone or in combination, there was a highly 
significant interaction effect for these two variables in predicting Grandiose delusions, as 
the multiplicative interaction term predicted about 23% of the variance in Grandiosity {R  ̂
A = 22, p  = .000); this is suggestive of a “pure moderation” effect, as defined by Baron 
and Kenny (1986). See Table 10 for more detailed results of these multiple regression 
equations.
Subgroup analyses for the basic main analyses were conducted to examine gender 
differences, and whether there might be gender effects on the relationships among 
dysfunctional attitudes, attributional style, and delusional ideation variables. The pattem 
of correlations among the DAS, IPSAQ subscales, and the PDI remained essentially the 
same when data from males and females were analyzed separately within the total sample 
and within the At-Risk data alone, in that significant correlations between delusions and 
dysfunctional attitudes (DAS scores) of the same average magnitude emerged with both 
genders. Of note is that in the At-Risk all male group data, the correlation between these 
variables remained partieularly strong (r = .52, p  =  .02), despite the small subgroup 
sample size of 19. See Tables 11a and 1 lb for gender-separated correlations of study 
variables.
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Two-way ANOVA analyses revealed no significant gender (male vs. female) by 
group (At-Risk vs. Control) differences in DAS scores, F ( l ,  129) = 1.83,/? = .31 or in 
overall PDI scores, F ( l ,  129) = \ .3 \ ,p  = .26. Given that there were no significant 
differences between males and females on these variables or differential patterns of 
correlations, regression equations analyzing specific risk factors predictive of delusional 
ideation were not pursued.
Discussion
The results from this study regarding correlates of risk to psychosis are in keeping 
with similar lines of research illustrating the existence of elements of cognitive 
vulnerability (e.g. dysfunctional self-concept/negative self-schema) in individuals with 
schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders. They are also in keeping with the emerging 
literature on targeting at-risk individuals via a state-trait recruitment methodology.
Targeting At-Risk Individuals Via the “State-Trait” Methodology
As Yung and colleagues (1998) and Morrison and colleagues (2002) have 
determined that it is feasible to target members of a legitimately at-risk group and predict 
their transition to psychosis, findings from the present research suggest that it is also 
feasible to utilize “trait plus state” techniques (in this case age, and most robustly degree 
of genetic risk and general diffuse psychological symptoms) to predict the existence of 
low-level delusional ideation. In fact, when targeting these at-risk individuals and 
comparing them to young adults with similar demographic characteristics who do not
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have these risk faetors, there was a very strong differenee between these two groups in 
number of delusions possessed. Not only does this finding support the notion that low- 
level delusional ideation may be more common than once thought (Peters, et al., 1996), it 
also presents the possibility that these low-level delusions may foreshadow development 
of more fine-tuned, potentially disturbing, and clinically-relevant beliefs in these young 
adults who have an elevated genetic predisposition for future psychosis. Furthermore, 
even with the modified “trait plus state” methodology utilized in the present study, 
important group differences are uncovered.
Interestingly, the strongest predictor of delusions (which served as the “outcome 
variable” for the purposes of this study) was general psychopathology. While the 
existence of diffuse symptomatology has been used as at-risk criteria in some studies 
(e.g., Yung, et al., 1998; Morrison, et al., 2002), it was surprising to find that this variable 
was a larger predictor than was degree of genetic risk, which, in the literature 
(particularly medical research) tends to emerge as the sine qua non of vulnerability 
factors for the development of sehizophrenia (Gottesman, 1991).
Two arguments can be made against regarding general psychopathology (OQ 
score) as a legitimate predictor of delusions. First, as low-level delusional ideation was 
used as the downstream variable in this study, as opposed to full transition to psychosis, it 
can be argued that having subclinical abnormal beliefs is not really indicative of anything 
close to having full-blown psychosis, and that using diffuse symptoms to predict such 
beliefs is not very meaningful. However, as this was a “risk” study and not a “transition 
to psychosis” study, was aimed at more developmental, “upstream” analyses of correlates
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of propensity for future psychosis, and utilized a sample of young adults who are on the 
cusp of being in the most at-risk age range for schizophrenia, it appears appropriate (and 
even more logical) to use low-level delusions as an outcome variable in place of some 
another more “diagnostic” criterion variable. Further, the presence or absence of 
delusions is often used as the defining factor in determining whether someone has made 
the transition to full psychosis and/or has a diagnosable psychotic condition (Larsen, 
McGlashan, & Moe, 1996) and is therefore an important criterion variable of interest, 
even though delusions did not mark this transition in the present sample.
Secondly, it may be argued that using diffuse psychopathology to predict 
delusional ideation is a circular analysis -  predicting symptoms with symptoms. Several 
researchers involved in targeting individuals at-risk for psychosis conceptualize “state” 
vulnerability as, “ [including] nonspecific symptoms such as anxiety; depressed mood; 
reduced drive, energy, and concentration; sleep disturbances; and behavioral changes 
such as deterioration in role functioning...” (McGorry, Yung, & Phillips, 2002). This 
suggests that these symptoms may be representative of several disorders and are not 
limited to any of the psychotic spectrum disorders, but should be used in conjunction 
with other traitlike indicators. The measure used in this study (the OQ) has 45 questions, 
none of which are specifically related to abnormal beliefs or delusions. Furthermore, the 
OQ does not just address basic symptoms, but also has several items that assess 
interpersonal interactions and more general social behaviors, which compose two of the 
three OQ subscales (Interpersonal Relations and Social Roles); it is very close to the 
conceptualization of the “at-risk mental state” defined by other researchers (e.g.,
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McGorry & Singh, 1995; Yung, et al., 1996; Yung et al., 1998). Thus, it appears that 
general psychopathology, measured as a combination of diffuse symptoms, dysfunctional 
interpersonal relationships, and instances of abnormal social behavior, can be 
conceptualized as a legitimate and useful predictor of delusional ideation. Therefore, 
utilizing the existence of general psychopathology to assess risk to psychosis not only 
makes conceptual sense, but when it is used in conjunction with additional “trait” 
characteristics (e.g., age and genetic risk), has demonstrated effectiveness in accurately 
aiding in the assessment of the transition to full psychosis. The combination of close 
genetic relatedness and this psychosocial measure of diffuse pathology as strong 
predictors in the current study further supports the diathesis-stress model of the 
development of psychological disorders, and in this case, of delusional beliefs that may 
be a component of burgeoning full-blown psychosis.
Results from the present research point to the feasibility of creating a “risk score” 
to quantify somewhat accurately and evaluate an individual’s degree of vulnerability to 
psychosis (or in this case, presence of general and specific facets of delusional ideation). 
Admittedly, the method used to calculate the risk score in this study was somewhat 
rudimentary. The dichotomization of scores from the general psychopathology 
questionnaire (using a cut-off score to determine “symptomatic” or “not symptomatic”), 
and the assumption that genetic risk increases via equal linear intervals depending on 
degree o f genetic family member closeness, together are likely to have detracted 
somewhat from the richness of the data and its interpretability. Future “at-risk” research 
should attempt to fine-tune and modify the computation and accuracy of such a risk
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score, as the development of a “quick and dirty” way to assess vulnerability to psychosis 
could be of great advantage in pinpointing individuals and providing early intervention. 
Nevertheless, the present study’s attempt to quantify risk does have some utility in 
predicting who will exhibit delusions and who will not, especially within this rather small 
sample, and can be regarded as a good first endeavor.
Aspects o f Cognitive Vulnerability in the At-Risk Sample
As predicted, individuals in the At-Risk Group had more pronounced aspects of 
disordered self-concept as compared to their Control Group counterparts. Although some 
recent studies have examined negative self-schema and dysfunctional attitudes in 
individuals with psychosis (e.g., Alford & Beck, 1994; Freeman, Garety, & Kuipers, 
2001) and have found this maladaptive cognitive style to be related to (and even 
theorized as a pathway to) delusions (Beck and Rector, 2002; Bentall, 2001; Bentall, 
Kinderman, & Kaney, 1994; Martin & Penn, 2002), there has been only one study to 
examine overall disordered self-concept in individuals at risk for psychosis (Morrison et 
al., 2002). Thus, the finding that negative cognitions occur to a greater degree in 
individuals who have a genetic predisposition for psychosis than in those who do not is a 
potentially important one. This suggests that the cognitive distortions about self, others, 
and the world that may be the cause of delusions likely emerge early on in one’s 
development into adulthood; they seem to become fairly solidified by the time one 
reaches the stage of young adulthood, which also happens to be the apex of the age range 
for initial psychotic breakdown.
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The interpretations of the findings in this study related to attributional style are 
somewhat more complex. As previously mentioned, research has suggested that while 
depressed individuals tend to attribute negative events to themselves and positive events 
to circumstances or to outside influences, individuals with delusions have the opposite 
pattem: they are more likely to believe that positive events are caused by their own doing 
and that negative events are caused by the actions of others (Candido & Romney, 1990; 
Kaney & Bentall, 1989; Lyon, Kaney, & Bentall, 1994). Overall, in the present research, 
the particular attributional style discussed in the literature as existing in individuals with 
full-blown psychosis was not found to be related to overall delusional ideation or to 
negative self-schema within the At-Risk Group. Contrary to prediction, the At-Risk 
Group did not attribute the causes of positive events to themselves more often than the 
Control Group, nor did they attribute negative events to others more often. In fact, both 
groups demonstrated a bias toward attributing the causes of positive events to themselves, 
the “self-serving bias” (Kaney & Bentall, 1992). While this is a somewhat surprising 
finding, it is of note the aforementioned theories about the attributional style of people 
with delusions developed from studies examining these biases in individuals who had 
diagnosable psychotic conditions, and the present study is the only one to date that 
directly measured attributional style in putatively at-risk individuals. Therefore, it is 
likely that the pattems of attributional biases are different between these two groups. It is 
possible that for many young adults at risk, while more diffuse disordered self-concept is 
related to delusions, a solidified abnormal bias about the cause of events, which has been 
said to serve as protection against low self-esteem (Beck & Rector, 2002; Bentall, 2001;
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Bentall, Kinderman, & Kaney, 1994; Lyon, Kaney, & Bentall, 1994) has not yet 
developed. It may be the case that a true “style” (e.g. a self-serving bias) emerges later in 
one’s developmental trajectory and/or in one’s psychotic symptom trajectory in those 
who go on to develop diagnosable psychosis.
Although in general there was no significant indication that At-Risk Group 
individuals displayed an attributional style similar to patients with psychosis, it was the 
case that a particular attributional style, in conjunction with other risk factors, played a 
role in the prediction of general and specific delusions, as discussed below.
A Basic Model o f Risk for Psychosis
In creating a model to understand better the relationship between genetic and 
psychosocial risk for psychosis and cognitive vulnerability in the prediction of delusions, 
it appears that it is generally some combination of risk and disordered thoughts about 
oneself and the causes of life events that actually forecast the existence of aberrant, 
distressing beliefs. Interestingly, it is the existence of a particular attributional style 
(believing that negative events in one’s life are caused by the acts of “malevolent others”) 
that has an exacerbating detrimental effect on being at risk for psychosis and may create a 
greater amount of delusional beliefs. If an individual has a genetic predisposition to 
psychosis and exhibits diffuse maladaptive psychological symptoms, it is the presence of 
this persecutory “style” of thinking about life events that really interacts with the genetic 
and symptom risk factors to create distressing beliefs that likely influence one’s behavior. 
Thus, it is not simply genetic factors, or even the combination of genetic and 
psychosocial risk, that truly predicts having such potentially upsetting beliefs; it is in fact
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a particular view of causation about positive and negative events in the world, in 
conjunction with risk, that plays a substantial role in the determination of which “at-risk” 
individuals develop potentially disturbing delusions.
In relation to the psychosis literature on common types of delusion themes 
(persecutory and grandiose) in individuals with full-blown ideation (Appelbaum, Clark 
Robbins, & Roth, 1999; Beck & Rector, 2002; Junginger, Barker, & Coe, 1992; Lucas, 
Sainsbury, & Collins, 1962; Sinha & Chaturvedi, 1989), results from this study suggest 
that even in subclinical individuals who may be at risk for psychosis, the themes of 
delusions may mirror those in patients with diagnosable psychotic conditions. This 
finding not only confirms the existence of elements of psychotic symptoms in at-risk 
individuals, but also lends support to the idea that delusion types do not manifest 
themselves in an arbitrary manner, as some would hypothesize (Berrios, 1991), but in a 
way that can actually be understood in terms of more specific concerns, fears, and ideas 
about oneself, one’s world, and one’s future (Beck & Rector, 2002; Chapman & 
Chapman, 1988; Harrow & Prosen, 1978; Harrow, Rattenbury, & Stoll, 1988). Findings 
from the present research support this idea of the individual “meaningfulness” of 
particular delusions, as it was found that the additive combination of general 
dysfunctional beliefs about oneself and other risk factors contribute greatly to the 
participants' degree of paranoid or persecutory delusions. In addition, grandiose 
delusions were most prominent in those at-risk individuals who speeifically blamed 
others for negative events in their lives. While this finding may seem somewhat 
counterintuitive, in that it may be expected that those with the tendency to excessively
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blame others for bad happenings would have persecutory delusions and not grandiose 
ones, it is possible that this blaming of others serves to bolster the individual’s self- 
confidence. If one can make others the scapegoats, it follows that one can let oneself 
“off the hook;’’ this may create an inflated sense of worth or ability that may grow in 
magnitude into a delusional belief. This "compensatory" view of delusions is consistent 
with the work of Beck and Rector (2002), Bentall and colleagues (1994), and Martin and 
Penn (2002).
Limitations o f the Present Research
While this study sheds light on some of the important, previously unresearched 
correlates of vulnerability to psychosis, it has some limitations. Obviously, an 
unfortunate circumstance during the data collection process was the omission of the 
question involving the participants’ own history of psychosis. Coupled with the low 
subject response-to-be-recontacted rate, this reduces to some degree the “pureness” of 
both the At-Risk and Control groups. As a result, it is theoretically possible that some 
members of both groups have had a prior psychotic episode. However, as described 
previously, the statistical likelihood of individuals in this age range having already had a 
previous psychotic episode is quite small. Undoubtedly, future researchers assessing risk 
should be certain to attend to participants’ own past psychiatric history in order to 
distinguish more clearly among at risk, remitted, and currently ill groups.
Another potential limitation of the present research is that the entire sample was 
composed only of undergraduate introductory psychology students, which can be
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regarded as an “analogue” sample, not a “clinical” sample, and therefore perhaps not a 
legitimately “at risk” sample. Despite the homogeneity of this sample, this group should 
still be regarded as representative of a true “vulnerable” sample for several reasons. First, 
these subjects are certainly at elevated genetic risk, as all of them were clear in their 
endorsement of having a first, second, or third degree biological relative with a diagnosed 
psychotic disorder. Their age range (broadly, between 18 and 36, and specifically, with 
an average age of 21) puts them squarely in the documented high-risk zone for onset of 
an initial psychotic break (APA, 2000). These two criteria (genetics and age) are two of 
the three used in past research that prospectively followed similar individuals, 
approximately 22-40% of whom had diagnosable psychotic symptoms six months after 
being targeted (Morrison, et al., 2002; Yung, et al., 1998). A third criterion for at-risk 
participants used in these past risk studies was the existence of diffuse psychological 
symptoms not necessarily related to psychosis. In the present study, a high percentage of 
subjects in the At-Risk Group had general psychopathology symptom levels that fell into 
the clinical or subclinical range (Lambert & Burlingame, 1996), and many had mildly 
elevated scores on the OQ. With such high levels of endorsed symptoms in so many of 
the At-Risk Group participants, it is likely that many of them were fairly distressed, and 
as a result, it is also fairly likely that many of them had already sought professional help 
for their distress and/or had some current involvement in mental health services. Thus, 
these individuals may be at more imminent risk for psychosis than is assumed. While a 
more heterogeneous participant recruitment strategy would have been ideal, the validity 
of the present study’s At-Risk Group as a true at-risk group should not be dismissed.
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Early Intervention Implications and Future D irections
With regard to clinical intervention, results from this study point to the need and 
the potential utility in creating a comprehensive program that both targets and provides 
mental health services to at-risk individuals. The literature suggests that there is a recent 
shift in focus regarding treatment of psychosis, as more and more researchers (and 
clinicians) are aiming to attend to the prevention of psychosis before it becomes 
treatment-refractory.
This emphasis is reflected in the recent development of the International 
Prodromal Research Network (IPRN; Comblatt, et al., 2003), the CBT randomized 
controlled trial with at-risk individuals conducted by Morrison and colleagues (2002), 
and the work McGorry, Yung, Phillips, and others in Australia, who have developed a 
research and treatment program for young-adult prepsychotic individuals. Their clinic 
provides interventions aimed at reducing patients’ symptoms and preventing the 
worsening of these symptoms into acute psychosis through the use of Cognitive- 
Behavioral therapy principles. They utilize other collaborative techniques as well (such 
as the therapist providing case management services to help with housing, benefits, work 
placement) in order to help patients reduce the impact of stressors that can exacerbate 
symptoms and “push” one into full-blown psychosis (McGorry, Yung, & Phillips, 2003).
While prevention and early intervention of schizophrenia have received a great 
deal of attention recently, there is not much data to date regarding what particular types 
of psychotherapeutic interventions are most useful to prevent the transition to psychosis. 
It is generally agreed upon that Cognitive and Cognitive-Behavioral interventions make
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intuitive sense (French, Morrison, Walford, Knight, & Bentall, 2003; McGorry, Yung, & 
Phillips, 2003; Morrison, et al., 2002), given the affective disturbances and distorted 
thinking that has been found to be present in these at-risk individuals. (Not to be confused 
with elements of Cognitive or Cognitive-Behavioral psychotherapy aimed at changing 
maladaptive cognitions, another type of intervention, called Cognitive Remediation, deals 
with the “retraining” of low-level memory, attention, and information processing deficits 
in patient populations; Green, 2001). However, specific CT or CBT interventions have 
not been officially targeted and tested with these at-risk groups in a true experimental 
fashion.
Results from this study help to elucidate specific vulnerability factors that put 
someone at risk to develop low-level delusional ideation. The findings indicate that a 
combination of genetic risk and psychosocial/diffuse general psychopathology are most 
predictive of delusions and therefore call for mental health workers and other health care 
providers to monitor more closely individuals who demonstrate these particular 
characteristics. The finding that disordered self-concept and a specific attributional style, 
in conjunction with these risk factors, predicts a high degree of potentially distressing 
delusions, may be a start in isolating the particular facets of cognitive vulnerability 
factors that afflict at-risk individuals. Results from this research could be expanded upon 
and used to create more specific targeted interventions based in CT and CBT in order to 
modify negative thoughts about self and maladaptive biases in the attributions of causes 
of life events. A reduction in negative self-schema and dysfunctional attributional style
69
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could in turn reduce levels of delusional ideation, or prevent these cognitions from 
increasing to the point where full-blown delusions (and/or other psychotic symptoms) 
develop, and more serious, continued treatment becomes necessary.
Given both the limitations of this study and the important knowledge gained, 
future research should attempt to replicate these findings utilizing larger, more diverse 
samples. These samples would ideally include heterogeneous groups of individuals 
within the appropriate age range from varied socioeconomic, ethnic, and geographic 
groups. A greater mixture of individuals recruited from different sources (e.g. university 
clinics and counseling centers, community mental health centers, private practitioner 
referrals) could potentially provide clearer, more useful, more generalizable, and more 
definitive data about genetic, psychosocial, and cognitive predictors of risk for psychosis. 
Such data could lead to more specific and efficacious psychotherapeutic interventions for 
this population.
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Table 1
Cognitive pathway to the formation o f a grandiose delusion (taken from Beck 
and Rector, 2002)
1. Underlying negative self-image. Socially awkward, alone, and disliked (although 
intellectually capable).
2. Extended fantasy/daydream. “Books were my only friends: — fantasizes about 
becoming a famous writer, receiving great praise and international recognition.
3. Critical incident. Mounting stress with school; difficulties completing school 
assignments; subsequent failure and shame.
4. Activities o f fantasy world. Patient begins to see self as the poet laureate.
5. Egocentric bias. Spends much of her time jotting down ideas “to be later 
published” and sits in public library throughout the day.
6. Confirmatory bias. Discounts/ignores information that challenges the belief.
7. “Connecting the dots.” Patient begins to live as if she is the poet laureate, with 
the expeetation of special recognition and privileges.
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Table 2
Cognitive pathway to the formation o f a persecutory delusion (taken from Beck and
Rector, 2002)
1. Fear o f retaliation. For reporting the drug dealers.
2. Elaboration o f conspiracy theory. After the reports of the police involvement in 
the drug dealing.
3. Egocentric bias. Selective focus on police to test his theory. The patient had a 
low threshold for danger signals, which gradually accumulated and further 
energized his persecutory focus.
4. Confirmatory bias. Patient assimilated examples of the police following him and 
ignored or discounted incidents that did not fit.
5. Enhancement o f similarity o f ‘‘persecutors.'’'' As the patient developed a mental 
representation of the “conspirators,” an increasing number of individuals seemed 
to fit this image.
6. Capitalizing on coincidence. The patient saw the same individual initially when 
shopping at a grocery store and later when attending a reception at his church. 
This coincidence confirmed that he was being followed.
7. “Connecting the dots.'''’ Putting together all this evidence, the patient became 
convinced that he was being observed by the police who presumably intended to 
harass and harm him.
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Table 3
Demographic data for At-Risk and Control Group subjects, n = 133
Demographic Variables At-Risk Group Control Group
n 61 72
Mean age 21.31 (3.79) 20.74 (3.36)
Males 19(31.1%) 25 (34.7%)
Females 42 (68.9%) 47 (65.3%)
Never Married/Single 50 (82.0%) 67 (93.1%)
Ever Married 11 (18.0%) 5 (6.9%)
Caucasian 55 (91.7%) 63 (88.7%)
Native American/Indian 1 (1.7%) 2 (2.8%)
African American/Black 0 1 (1.4%)
Hispanic/Latino 0 1 (1.4%)
Other 4 (6.7%) 4 (5.6%)
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Table 4
Descriptive statistics and alpha reliability coefficients for study measures and relevant
subscales
Measure Mean SD a
Outcome Questionnaire (OQ-45.2) 50.06 21.05 .93
Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale (DAS) 111.67 31.77 .92
Internal, Personal, Situational Attributions Questionnaire 
(IPSAQ) Internal attributions for positive events
8.05 2.83 .74
IPSAQ External personal attributions for negative events 5.95 2.79 .80
Peters et al. Delusions Inventory original scale (PDI) 62.08 47.83 .89
PDI new 8-item shortened scale 17.80 13.59 .67
PDI new Grandiose subscale 10.50 9.35 .56
PDI new Persecutory subscale 7.31 7.87 .72
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Table 5
Summary fit  statistics for competing 2-factor models o f the modified PDI, n = 61
Model A' df ^2/df GFI AGFI RMSEA 90% Cl
Independence 125.578 28 4.49 0.65 0.54 0.24 0.20-0.29
Orthogonal 37.13 20 1.86 0.86 0.75 0.12 0.06-0.18
Oblique 36.63 19 1.93 0.86 0.74 0.12 0.06-0.18
Note: to df ratio; GFI = goodness of fit index; AGFI = adjusted goodness of fit
index; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation.
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Figure 1
Two-factor oblique model o f shortened Peters et al. Delusions Inventory with newly-
developed Persecutory and Grandiose subscales, n = 61.
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Table 6a.
Correlations among cognitive vulnerability and delusions measures for the total study
sample, n -  133
Measure DAS Internal
Positive
External
Negative
PDI total Grandiose Persecutory
DAS —
Internal
Positive
.12 —
External
Negative
-.05 .10 —
PDI total .04 -.04 —
Grandiose .11 .02 -.12 .68**
Persecutory .30** .09 -.06 7t** 24**
Note: **p < .01. DAS = Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale; Internal Positive = IPSAQ 
internal attributions for positive events subscale; External Negative = IPSAQ external 
attributions for negative events towards people subscale; PDI total = Peters et al. 
Delusions Inventory original scale total score; Grandiose = shortened PDI grandiose 
subscale; Persecutory = shortened PDI persecutory subscale.
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Table 6b
Correlations among cognitive vulnerability and delusions measures within the At-Risk
sample, n = 61
Measure DAS Internal
Positive
External
Negative
PDI total Grandiose Persecutory
DAS —
Internal
Positive
.20 —
External
Negative
-.14 .09 —
PDI total .20 -.04 —
Grandiose .10 .09 -.13 .63**
Persecutory .34** .26* -.07 70**
Note: *p < .05. **p < .01. DAS = Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale; Internal Positive = 
IPSAQ internal attributions for positive events subscale; External Negative = IPSAQ 
external attributions for negative events towards people subscale; PDI total = Peters et al. 
Delusions Inventory original scale total score; Grandiose = shortened PDI grandiose 
subscale; Persecutory = shortened PDI persecutory subscale.
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Table 7
Hierarchical regression analysis summary for determining risk variables that best
predict overall delusional ideation, n = 61.
Variables/Model AR^ 13 P
1. OQ score .396 .396 .63 .0001
2. OQ score .451 .055 .63 .02
Genetic Risk -.24
3. OQ score .453 .002 .64 .68
Genetic Risk -.22
Age -.04
4. OQ score X Genetic Risk Interaction .455 .002 -.05 .65
5. OQ score X Genetic Risk X Age .458 .004 .07 .55
Interaction
Note: OQ = Outcome Questionnaire (general psychopathology measure); Genetic Risk = 
degree of risk based on family member genetic closeness (1®*, 2"*̂ , or 3'̂ '̂ degree); Age = 
between 18 and 36.
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Table 8
Criteria used to determine “risk score ’’for use in multiple regression analyses
(Hypothesis 6), calculated using data from hierarchical regression analysis (Hypothesis
5, Table 7)
OQ Score Genetic Risk 
(L‘, 2"^ or 3’‘‘̂ degree 
relative)
Risk Score Assigned
>63 degree relative 6
>63 degree relative 5
>63 3'̂ ‘̂ degree relative 4
<63 L* degree relative 3
<63 2"̂ * degree relative 2
<63 3'̂ ’̂ degree relative 1
Note: OQ Score determined by Lambert & Burlingame (1996) OQ manual clinical cutoff 
score; Genetic Risk: degree = parent, child, sibling, 2"*̂  degree = aunt/uncle,
grandparent, 3'̂ '̂ degree = cousin, great-aunt/uncle, great-grandparent.
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Table 9
Multiple regression analysis summary for risk score and cognitive variables predicting
general delusional ideation, n = 61.
Table 9a
Analysis fo r risk score and level o f dysfunctional attitudes (negative self-schema) in 
predicting delusions.
V ariables/Model R" AR^ P
1. Risk Score .075 .075 .28 .03
2. DAS Total Score .243 .167 .50 .001
3. Risk Score X DAS Total Score 
Interaction
.244 .001 -.04 .79
Note: Risk Score = weighted combination of OQ score 
DAS Total Score = Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale.
and genetic risk (see Table 8)
Table 9b
Analysis fo r risk score and attributional style (internal 
in predicting delusions.
attributions for positive event.
Variables/Model AR^ P
1. Risk Score .075 .075 .28 .03
2. IPSAQ intemal positive attributions .104 .029 .17 .18
3. Risk Score X EPSAQ intemal 
positive attributions Interaction
.105 .001 -.03 .80
Note: Risk Score = weighted combination of OQ score and genetic risk (see Table 8); 
IPSAQ internal positive attributions = Intemal, Personal, & Situational Attribution 
Questionnaire intemal attributions for positive events subscale.
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Table 9c
Analysis for risk score and attributional style (external attributions towards people for
negative events) in predicting delusions.
Variables/Model AR^ P
1. Risk Score .075 .075 .28 .03
2. IPSAQ extemal negative attributions .077 .001 -.04 .77
3. Risk Score X IPSAQ extemal 
attributions Interaction
.160 .084 -.31 .02
Note: Risk Score = weighted combination of OQ score and genetic risk (see Table 8); 
IPSAQ external negative attributions = Intemal, Personal, & Situational Attribution 
Questionnaire extemal attributions towards people for negative events subscale.
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Table 10
Multiple regression analysis summary for risk score and cognitive variables predicting
specific types o f delusional ideation (persecutory and grandiose), n -  61.
Table 10a
Analysis for risk score and level o f dysfunctional attitudes (negative self-schema) in 
predicting persecutory delusions.
Variables/Model P
1. Risk Score .053 .053 .23 .07
2. DAS Total Score .119 .065 .31 .04
3. Risk Score X DAS Total Score 
Interaction
.144 .025 .18 .20
Note: Risk Score = weighted eombination of OQ score 
DAS Total Score = Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale.
Table 10b
and genetic risk (see Table 8)
Analysis for risk score and level o f dysfunctional attitudes (negative self-schema) in 
predicting grandiose delusions.
Variables/Model R' iS P
1. Risk Score .000 .000 .00 .99
2. DAS Total Score .014 .014 .14 .37
3. Risk Score X DAS Total Seore 
Interaction
.059 .045 -.25 .10
Note: Risk Score = weighted combination of OQ score and genetic risk (see Table 8); 
DAS Total Score = Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale.
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Table 10c
Analysis for risk score and attributional style (internal attributions fo r  positive events)
in predicting persecutory delusions.
Variables/Model AR^ P
1. Risk Score .053 .053 .23 .07
2. IPSAQ intemal positive attributions .111 .058 .24 .06
3. Risk Score X IPSAQ intemal 
positive attributions Interaction
.111 .000 -.02 .90
Note: Risk Score = weighted combination of OQ score and genetic risk (see Table 8) 
IPSAQ intemal positive attributions = Intemal, Personal, & Situational Attribution 
Questionnaire intemal attributions for positive events subscale.
Table lOd
Analysis for risk score and attributional style (internal positive attributions for positi 
events) in predicting grandiose delusions.
Variables/Model 13 P
1. Risk Score .000 .000 .00 .99
2. IPSAQ intemal positive attributions .007 .007 .08 .51
3. Risk Score X IPSAQ intemal 
positive attributions Interaction
.041 .033 -.19 .16
Note: Risk Score = weighted combination of OQ score and genetic risk (see Table 8); 
IPSAQ intemal positive attributions = Intemal, Personal, & Situational Attribution 
Questionnaire intemal attributions for positive events subscale.
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Table lOe
Analysis for risk score and attributional style (external attributions towards people for  
negative events) in predicting persecutory delusions.
Variables/Model 1^ ^  ^
1. Risk Score .053 .053 .23 .07
2. IPSAQ extemal negative attributions .058 .005 -.07 .59
3. Risk Score X IPSAQ extemal .059 .001 -.04 .80
attributions Interaction
Note: Risk Score = weighted combination of OQ score and genetic risk (see Table 8); 
IPSAQ extemal negative attributions = Intemal, Personal, & Situational Attribution 
Questionnaire extemal attributions towards people for negative events subscale.
Table lOf
Analysis for risk score and attributional style (external attributions towards people for  
negative events) in predicting grandiose delusions.
V ariables/Model ^
1.Risk Score ^00 ^00 ^00 .99
2. IPSAQ extemal negative attributions .016 .016 -.13 .36
3. Risk Score X IPSAQ extemal .233 .217 -.50 .000
attributions Interaction
Note: Risk Score = weighted combination of OQ score and genetic risk (see Table 8); 
EPSAQ extemal negative attributions = Intemal, Personal, & Situational Attribution 
Questionnaire extemal attributions towards people for negative events subscale.
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Table 11a
Correlations among cognitive vulnerability and delusions measures for males in the total
study sample, n = 44
Measure DAS Intemal
Positive
Extemal
Negative
PDI total Grandiose Persecutory
DAS —
Intemal
Positive
.22 —
Extemal
Negative
-.11 -.02 —
PDI total 4'7** .07 -.13 —
Grandiose .24 -.07 -.17 .64**
Persecutory .30 .26 -.13 25**
Note: **p < .01. DAS = Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale; Intemal Positive = IPSAQ 
intemal attributions for positive events subscale; Extemal Negative = IPSAQ extemal 
attributions for negative events towards people subscale; PDI total = Peters et al. 
Delusions Inventory original scale total score; Grandiose = shortened PDI grandiose 
subseale; Persecutory = shortened PDI perseeutory subseale.
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Table 11b
Correlations among cognitive vulnerability and delusions measures for females in the
total study sample, n = 89
Measure DAS Intemal
Positive
Extemal
Negative
PDI total Grandiose Persecutory
DAS —
Intemal
Positive
.06 —
Extemal
Negative
.00 .15 —
PDI total .30** .03 .04 —
Grandiose .01 .06 -.07 70**
Perseeutory .30** -.02 .01 .72** .22*
Note: **p < .01, *p < .05. DAS = Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale; Intemal Positive = 
IPSAQ intemal attributions for positive events subseale; Extemal Negative = IPSAQ 
extemal attributions for negative events towards people subseale; PDI total = Peters et al. 
Delusions Inventory original scale total seore; Grandiose = shortened PDI grandiose 
subscale; Perseeutory = shortened PDI persecutory subscale.
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Family Mental Health History Questionnaire
Please carefully read the following questions and answer to the best o f your ability. Thank you in advance for your 
participation. All o f these questions apply to a BIOLOGICAL (“blood”) relative, NOT to yourself.
*Your ag e____________
1. Sometimes people behave in a way that seems abnormal or even “psychotic” or “crazy” to others. Sometimes people 
observe these behaviors in friends or family members, or are told by other people that their friends or family members 
did or said something extremely bizarre or seemingly abnormal, “psychotic” or “crazy.”
Have you ever observed (or been told by another person) that a biological relative o f yours fit the above description?
 yes
 no
If so, what relation is that person (or people, if  more than one) to you? (check all that apply)
P aren t  A unt/U nele  Other, please specify_______
C hild   Grandparent____
Sibling  N ieee/Nephew____
2. To your knowledge, have you ever noticed or been told by another person that a biological relative of yours said or 
did any o f the following; (check all that apply)
 Mentioned that they felt that others were talking about them or taking speeial notice o f them?
Mentioned that they felt that they were receiving special messages from the TV, radio, or newspaper, or from the 
way things were arranged around them?
Mentioned that they felt that they were especially important in some way, or that they had the power to do things 
that other people couldn’t do?
Mentioned that they felt that someone (or several people, or an important group) was going out o f his/her way to 
give your relative a hard time, or try to hurt them?
_ Mentioned that they felt that something was wrong with them physically, even though their doctor said nothing 
was wrong?
Mentioned that they felt that something strange was happening to parts o f their body?
Mentioned that they felt that they had committed a crime or done something terrible for which they should be 
punished?
Mentioned that they felt that other people could read their mind?
Mentioned that they felt that someone or something outside themselves was controlling their thoughts or actions 
against their will?
Mentioned that they felt that certain thoughts that were not their own were being put into their head?
Mentioned that they felt that thoughts were being taken out o f their head?
Mentioned that they felt that thoughts were being broadcasted out loud so that other people could actually hear 
what they were thinking?
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 Mentioned that they heard things sometimes (or often) that other people couldn’t hear, such as noises or the
v o ic e s  o f  p e o p le  w h is p e r in g  or ta lk in g ?
 M en tio n e d  th at th e y  h ad  v is io n s  or sa w  th in g s  th at o th er  p e o p le  c o u ld n ’t s ee  ( in  a  w a y  that o th ers  regard ed  as a
problem)?
 Mentioned that they had strange sensations in their body or on their skin?
 Mentioned that they could smell things that other people couldn’t smell?
 Did you yourself see them appear to be talking to themselves out loud or seem like they were having a
conversation or an argument with someone else, although no one else was really there?
 Did you yourself notice that they appeared to see or hear or smell something that other people couldn’t see or hear
or smell?
If  you ehecked any items in the previous list:
What relation is that person (or people, if  more than one) to you?
(This can be the same person or people that you answered about in question #1) (check all that apply)
Paren t  A unt/U ncle  Other, please specify______
C hild   Grandparent____
Sibling  N iece/Nephew____
3. Sometimes the above “abnormal” feelings, thoughts and actions take place when people are under the influence of 
alcohol, drugs, or other prescription medication. To your knowledge, did these things occur at times OTHER than 
when your relative (or relatives) was drinking, using drugs, or taking medication?
 yes, they took place when he/she was not under the influence o f any substances that could have caused these
behaviors.
 no, they only took place when he/she was under the influence of a substance that could have caused these
behaviors.
4. To your knowledge, have any of your biological relatives ever had (or currently have) a psychological diagnosis o f 
any o f the following disorders:
Schizophrenia  Psychosis, not otherwise specified_____
Schizoaffective D isorder  Delusional D isorder_____
Schizotypal Personality D isorder  Schizophreniform D isorder_____
*If you checked any items in #4:
What relation is that person (or people, if  more than one) to you?
{This can be the same person or people that you answered about in question #I and/or #2) (check all that apply)
P aren t  A unt/U ncle  Other, please specify______
C hild   Grandparent____
Sibling  N iece/Nephew____
A nd one last question...
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5. Would you be willing to be contacted in the next few weeks to a month or so in order to come and answer more 
q u estio t is?  P le a s e  n o te  th at a ll r e s p o n se s  at th is  s e c o n d  m e e t in g  w ill  b e  c o m p le te ly  c o n fid en tia l (a s  th e y  are to d a y )  
AND your name will NOT appear on any documents. Psyc 100 credits will be offered, or if  you already have all of 
your necessary credits, another form o f compensation for your time will be provided.
yes
no
6. If “yes” to the previous question, piease GO BACK TO THE BOTTOM OF YOUR CONSENT FORM and 
provide the requested contact information so we can get in touch with you. Please be sure to complete M  of the 
information if possible. Note that ail of the contact information will be known oniv to the research team for this 
study, will be kept in a locked cabinet, and will be destroyed after this study ends.
Now please flip back to your consent form and fill in the contact information if  you are willing to be recontacted. 
Thank you!
Again, thank you for your participation today!!!
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Men and Women who hove a relative with schizophrenia or 
another psychotic disorder are needed to participate in
research
Adults between the ages of 18 and 36 who have a blood relative who may have any of the 
following diagnoses:
schizophrenia 
schizoaffective disorder 
schizophreniform disorder 
schizotypal personality disorder 
delusional disorder
psychotic disorder, not otherwise specified
*please note that even if you are unsure about your relative’s exact diagnosis, you will likely 
still oualifv for the sturiv.
Participation is completely confidential and takes only 30-45 minutes. 
Participants will receive $10 in appreciation of their contribution.
For more information or to participate, please call and leave a message at:
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